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INTRODUCTION
This Article offers a novel account of the relationship between the ethi-
cal obligations of professionals and international human rights law and
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practice. The account is motivated by the role that professionals played in
the Bush administration's "war on terror"-in particular, the global deten-
tion and interrogation regimes that incarcerated tens of thousands of
detainees, and abused many of them. In the most extreme cases, profession-
als may have committed serious international crimes rendering them liable
to criminal prosecution in foreign courts.' Serious concerns have also been
raised about the ethics of professionals' conduct. Psychologists were the
principal architects of the aggressive detention and interrogation regimes
operated by both the U.S. Defense Department and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). These regimes incorporated a variety of coercive techniques
including sleep deprivation, exposure to temperature extremes and loud
noise, stress positions, 2 and-in the case of the CIA-dousing with cold
water and waterboarding, the now infamous procedure that induces a des-
perate feeling of suffocation in those exposed to it.
3
Government lawyers wrote opinions-documents that David Luban has
characterized as "CYA" (cover your ass) memoranda-giving the green
light to interrogators to use a variety of aggressive, so-called "enhanced"
interrogation techniques including the waterboard. Opinions on the legality
of interrogation techniques were not only provided in the abstract, but in
relation to the interrogation of specific, named detainees.5 Physicians in the
I. See generally Jonathan H. Marks, Mending the Web: Universal Jurisdiction, Hu-
manitarian Intervention and the Abrogation of Immunity by the Security Council, 42 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445, 445-90 (2004) (discussing universal jurisdiction, its theoretical un-
derpinnings, and potential objections to it).
2. E.g., U.S. SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 1 10TH CONG., 2D SESS., INQUIRY
INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY 207-15 (2008) [hereinafter SENATE
COMM. INQUIRY], available at http://documents.nytimes.com/report-by-the-senate-
armed-services-committee-on-detainee-treatment#p=l; see also INSPECTOR GEN., CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES
(SEPTEMBER 2001-OCTOBER 2003) 41-44, 69-77 (2004), available at http://media
.Iuxmedia.com/aclu/IGReport.pdf.
3. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 2, at 22, 44-45; see also SENATE COMM. INQUIRY,
supra note 2, at xvi.
4. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 200 (2007).
5. The prime example, perhaps the urtext in this regard, is the August 1, 2002, mem-
orandum ("Zubaydah Memo") signed by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee (now a
federal judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) and addressed to the Acting
General Counsel of the CIA, John Rizzo. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agen-
cy (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-bybee2002.pdf; see
also Letter from John D. Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to John E. McLaughlin,
Acting Director of Cent. Intelligence, Cent. Intelligence Agency (July 22, 2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-mclaughlin2004.pdf. In this one-paragraph letter
Attorney General Ashcroft confirmed that the use of all but one of the interrogation tech-
niques in the Zubaydah Memo (the exception being waterboarding) on a specific detainee
held outside the United States would not violate the U.S. Constitution nor any statute or
treaty obligation of the United States (including the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and de-
grading treatment in the Torture Convention) "subject to the assumptions and limitations" in
the Zubaydah Memo. Id. Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, wrote several
(Vol. 33:215
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CIA's Office of Medical Services advised that waterboarding was "medical-
ly acceptable" provided that a physician was present to monitor the
application of the technique and that surgical equipment was on hand in
case an emergency tracheotomy had to be conducted to enable the detainee
to resume breathing. 6 Doctors and psychologists evaluated detainees, ad-
vised on individual interrogation plans, monitored interrogations, and took
notes on the effects of the interrogation techniques-opening them to accu-
sations that they were also complicit in unlawful experimentation on human
subjects.7 Recognition of the mutually supportive and enabling roles of this
triad of professionals (the lawyers, the doctors, and the psychologists) is
central to any understanding of systematic detainee abuse in the war on ter-
ror.' Additional questions have also been raised about the role of
anthropologists working in the Defense Department's Human Terrain Pro-
gram-including whether they are conducting research without consent and
whether the results of that research are being used in a manner that is harm-
ful to the research subjects.' Of further concern are the related claims (now
being made and acknowledged within the journalism community) that sto-
ries of detainee abuse were "buried, played down, or ignored" in the U.S.
press, even after the Abu Ghraib photographs were released in April 2004;
letters to John Rizzo at the CIA in August and September 2004 advising that the use of a
variety of techniques, including waterboarding and dousing with cold water, in relation to an
individual detainee (or detainees) would not violate any U.S. statute (including the Torture
Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A), the U.S. Constitution, or any U.S. treaty obligation. E.g., Letter
from Daniel B. Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to John A. Rizzo,
Acting Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency (Aug. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-rizzo2004.pdf; Letter from Daniel B. Levin to John
A. Rizzo (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-rizzo2004-
3.pdf; Letter from Daniel B. Levin to John A. Rizzo (Sep. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-rizzo2004-4.pdf; Letter from Daniel B. Levin to
John A. Rizzo (Sep. 20, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-
rizzo2004-2.pdf.
6. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence
Agency 14, 16 (May 10, 2005), available at http://media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc-
05102005_bradbury46pg.pdf. The words "medically acceptable" are apparently taken from
the CIA's Office of Medical Service (OMS) Guidelines of December 2004, but in all the
publicly available versions of those guidelines, the section containing these words appears to
have been redacted.
7. STEVE MILES, OATH BETRAYED: AMERICA'S TORTURE DOCTORS app. at 169-80
(2009); PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AIDING TORTURE: HEALTH PROFESSIONALS' ETHICS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DEMONSTRATED IN THE MAY 2004 CIA INSPECTOR GEN-
ERAL'S REPORT 4-5 (2009), available at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/news-
2009-08-31 .html.
8. See generally Richard Abel, Professional Integrity, in LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY
458-64 (Michael Freeman & David Napier eds., 2009); David Luban, Torture and the Pro-
fessions, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 2, 2, 58 (2007).
9. E.g., Abel, supra note 8, at 434; see also Luban, supra note 8, at 63; Vanessa M.
Gazari, Rough Terrain, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/21/AR2009082101926.html (discussing the continuing role of
anthropologists in the Human Terrain Program).
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that some stories were not diligently followed up; and that others were al-
lowed to become stale before being fully told.'1
Torture in the war on terror is illustrative, perhaps emblematic, of the
problematic roles professionals may play in human rights violations. But the
scope of the problem is much wider in three senses. First, the complicity of
professionals in human rights violations in the United States is not a phe-
nomenon that originates with the war on terror. More than one hundred
years ago the United States used the brutal "water cure," a predecessor to
the waterboard, on local "insurgents" in the war in the Philippines who were
considered "undeserving" of the protections of the laws of war." Less well
known perhaps, this procedure was carried out under the supervision of a
lawyer and with the assistance of a physician. 2 More recently, the Cold War
provides further examples of the complicity of health professionals in hu-
man rights violations committed in the name of national security. 3
Second, the scope of the problem is broader geographically as well as
temporally. There are many examples of the complicity of professionals
(especially doctors) in torture and detainee abuse-in South Africa, the So-
viet Union, and Uruguay, to name just three. 4 As Elaine Scarry has acutely
observed, "it is in the nature of torture that the two ubiquitously present
should be medicine and law, health and justice, for they are the institutional
elaborations of body and state."' 5 Third, there is much more to human rights
law than the prohibition of torture. For every detainee waterboarded in the
10. Eric Umansky, Failures of Imagination: American Journalists and the Coverage of
American Torture, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 16, 16-18, 20-21. For a
related critique of U.S. media coverage of the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, see also
Jonathan H. Marks, The Fourth Estate and the Case for War in Iraq, in THE AGE OF APOLO-
GY: FACING UP TO THE PAST 298, 298-314 (Mark Gibney et al. eds., 2008).
11. In the "water cure," water (sometimes salted) was siphoned into the nostrils of
prisoners until they provided the name of a village where other "insurgents" were supposedly
hiding out. If the siphoning failed to procure a response, soldiers would jump on the victim's
stomach to expel the water. The village named by the prisoner would be burned to the
ground, whether or not insurgents were in fact hiding there. This is discussed further in Jona-
than H. Marks, Doctors as Pawns? Law and Medical Ethics at Guantanamo Bay, 37 SETON
HALL L. REV. 711, 728-29 (2007). See also Paul Kramer, The Water Cure: Debating Torture
and Counterinsurgency-A Century Ago, NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.public-access-project.org/pal55.pdf (discussing the practice of the "water cure").
12. Hearings on Affairs in the Philippines Before the S. Comm on the Philippines, 57th
Cong. 1527-38 (1902) (statement of Charles S. Riley), discussed in Marks, supra note 11, at
728-29.
13. See, e.g., ALFRED McCoy, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 21-55 (2006).
14. DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 392-94 (2007) (Soviet Union); M.G.
Bloche, Uruguay's Military Physicians: Cogs in a System of State Terror, 255 J. AM. MED.
Ass'N 2788, 2788-93 (1986) (Uruguay); Derrick Silove, Doctors and the State: Lessons
from the Biko Case, 30 Soc. ScI. MED. 417, 421-25 (1990) (South Africa).
15. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 42 (1985). For a magisterial review of the
history of torture, see REJALI, supra note 14. Rejali provides a comprehensive account of
torture techniques, but does not focus a great deal of attention on the role of health profes-
sionals in their design and application.
[Vol. 33:215
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war on terror, many thousands of detainees (in Afghanistan, Iraq, Guan-
tanamo Bay, and numerous secret locations elsewhere) were exposed to
conditions that violated their human rights in many other ways. 16 Finally,
the value of the account I offer is most apparent in extremis, for example, in
a national security crisis or public health emergency when human rights are
particularly vulnerable to abuse, neglect, or both. But the relevance and ap-
plication of the theory is not limited to these cases.
Part I elaborates on the meaning of the terms "professionals" and "hu-
man rights" as I employ them here. Part II establishes a framework for
understanding the relationship between professional power on the one hand
and violations of, or compliance with, human rights on the other. In Part III,
I articulate a relationship of mutual dependence between professionals and
states that provides a solid foundation for the human rights obligations of
professionals. Part IV outlines a novel contractarian approach to the human
rights obligations of professionals and concludes by speaking to the content
of those obligations. Part V engages with scholarship on professional essen-
tialism and addresses the implications of the account offered here in the
context of that literature. Part VI explores the idea of the professional as
rooted cosmopolitan and shows how the account offered here can give some
substance to that notion. In Part VII, I focus on the practical implications of
my account-in particular, what it means for the education and mentorship
of professionals, how we might redefine human rights practice as a central
component of professional practice, and how this should help bridge the gap
between human rights commitments and human rights compliance.
I. LOCATING PROFESSIONALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Before proceeding, I will address briefly what I mean by "professionals"
and "human rights." There is a rich literature on the criteria for identifying a
professional, and for distinguishing a profession from a "mere" occupation.
Particular attention is usually paid to the ends of the profession (whether it
serves a fundamental social need or provides a public good), the nature of
the professional practice (in particular, the expertise, skills, and judgment
exercised), the degree of autonomy within the practice, the nature and extent
of gatekeeping (including the educational and training requirements for
admission to the profession and continuation of practice), whether
practitioners have a monopoly in relation to some or all of the elements of
their practice, the degree of self-regulation, and the extent of applicable ethical
16. For an early and articulate indictment of the detention regime at Guantanamo Bay,
see Johan Steyn, Jud. Member of the House of Lords, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black
Hole, 27th F.A. Mann Lecture (Nov. 25, 2003), http://www.statewatch.org/news2OO3/nov
guantanamo.pdf. The U.S. Supreme Court has been slower to recognize the fundamental
rights of detainees under international law, but Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006),
was a landmark case, recognizing that al-Qa'ida suspects are protected by Common Article
III of the Geneva Conventions.
Winter 2012]
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codes.17 I do not intend to provide an exhaustive account of prevailing
theories; nor will I develop a theory of my own here. In my view, it is
unnecessary to do either of these because the theory of professional ethics
and human rights I offer provides a workable approach to this issue. For the
moment, I invite the reader to focus on paradigm cases, such as the
physician and the lawyer, rather than penumbral cases. This is not to suggest
that the penumbral cases are unimportant; on the contrary, some may be
very important and, as human rights norms and professional practices both
evolve, become more so.18
Except where I indicate expressly to the contrary, human rights here
mean those rights in the legal sense, that is, the body of norms constituting
international human rights law and its associated global discourse and prac-
tice. There are a number of features of this body of law and practice that are
relevant to the account and the underlying rationale offered here. Some of
these will be obvious to readers familiar with human rights law.
First, as Charles Beitz reiterates in his recent account of the origins of
international human rights law and the nature of the associated practice, the
17. I will not attempt provide an exhaustive list of books and articles addressing the
definition of professional. However, for a selection of readings addressing definitional issues,
see ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROFESSIONAL LIFE 26-46 (Joan Callahan ed., 1988) (providing ex-
cerpts from the work of Michael Bayles, Everett Hughes, and Bernard Barber among others).
For another recent distillation of the literature, see Richard Greenstein, Against Professional-
ism, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 327, 330, 349 (2009) (outlining three factors: the provision of
services is perceived as fundamental to the well being of the community; the provision of
services requires significant skill, including intellectual skill; and the existence of regulation
through official state organs or through state proxies).
18. For example, the category of "health professionals" has expanded considerably in
recent years. Although many occupations are now regulated as professions, not all of these
occupations would necessarily be accommodated by traditional accounts of professionalism.
In New York State, for example, several different health-related professions are regulated.
E.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 6731 (McKinney 2008) (regulating physical therapist assistants); id.
§ 7800 (regulating massage therapists); id. § 6600 (regulating certified dental assistants). A
bill proposed by Richard Gottfried in the New York state legislature to address the participa-
tion of health care professionals in torture and improper treatment of prisoners covers all
health professionals, including those not traditionally regulated. See Press Release, N.Y.
State Assembly, Health Profession Leaders Endorse Anti-Torture Bill (May 25, 2010), http://
assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Health/20100526. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the Health
Professions Council currently regulates fifteen occupations defined as "health professions."
About Us, HEALTH PROFESSIONS COUNCIL, http://www.hpc-uk.org/aboutus. They are arts
therapists, biomedical scientists, chiropodists/podiatrists, clinical scientists, dietitians, hear-
ing aid dispensers, occupational therapists, operating department practitioners, orthoptists,
paramedics, physiotherapists, practitioner psychologists, prosthetists/orthotists, radiog-
raphers, and speech and language therapists. Id. The council's function is to protect the
public and to that end it keeps a registry of health professionals who meet the council's
"standards for training, professional skills, behaviour and health." Id. Physicians are regulat-
ed by a separate body in the United Kingdom, the General Medical Council. The Role of the
GMC, GEN. MED. COUNCIL, http://www.gmc-uk.org/about/role.asp.
[Vol. 33:215
Professional Ethics and Human Rights
architects of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights expressly disa-
vowed any single, unifying philosophical foundation for their enterprise.' 9
Second, in international law, human rights norms vary in nature and
kind. It is important to avoid a simplistic conception of human rights in
which all rights are considered absolute and capable of trumping all other
considerations;20 this is not how human rights function in international
law and practice. 21 For example, while some rights under the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) are absolute and
nonderogable, many rights are qualified in that interference with them is
justifiable in certain circumstances and, in the most extreme cases, they
may also be subject to formal derogations.22 The prohibition of torture, and
19. CHARLES BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 18-27 (2009). For a book-length
account of the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see MARY ANN
GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001). As Beitz observes, the challenge was "to frame a public doctrine
that was capable of endorsement from a variety of moral and cultural viewpoints" and "to
preserve the international doctrine from philosophical parochialism that would have limited
its appeal and narrowed its normative scope." BEITZ, supra, at 21, 67. Anticipating a post-
colonial critique, one of the drafters, Charles Malik, a Lebanese diplomat and philosopher,
noted at the time that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was constructed on the
"firm international basis where no regional philosophy or way of life was permitted to pre-
vail." GLENDON, supra, at 164. This passage is discussed in Mathias Risse, Securing Human
Rights Intellectually: Philosophical Inquiries About the Universal Declaration t (Harv. Ken-
nedy Sch. Fac. Research, Working Paper No. RWP09-024, 2009), available at http://
web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=392.
20. See BEITZ, supra note 19, at 30 (noting that "not all of the human rights of con-
temporary doctrine can plausibly be regarded as preemptory," and that "[i]n this respect,
human rights seem to depart from a familiar (if perhaps a naive) paradigm of fundamental
rights").
21. The core structure of international human rights law is to be found in the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights, which comprises the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR], and the two
treaties concluded in 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. The bifurcation of human
rights into these two categories by the treaties in 1966 (only one of which, the ICCPR, has
been ratified by the United States) will have some implications for the way in which my
theory applies to professionals in the United States. See infra note 145. The ICCPR provides
that each state "undertakes . . to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant." ICCPR, supra, art. 2. By con-
trast, a state's obligation under the ICESCR is "to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maxi-
mum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means." ICECSR, supra, art.
2. This is sometimes termed an obligation of progressive realization. See U.N. Comm. on
Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights [CESCRI, General Comment 3, The Nature of States' Parties
Obligations, 4, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990). In this sense, the ICCPR is more
demanding on states than the ICESCR.
22. Formal derogations require an official proclamation that the life of the nation is
threatened, plus notification to the other states parties (via the Secretary-General of the
Winter 20121
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of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment is an example of
the former.23 By contrast, the right to privacy articulated in Article 17 of the
ICCPR is qualified; only "arbitrary or unlawful interferences are prohibit-
ed."24 While absolute, nonderogable rights leave states no room for
maneuver, this is not the case with qualified rights. Notably, the European
Court of Human Rights accords a "margin of appreciation" (or sphere of
discretion) to states when assessing whether their interference with a quali-
fied right is justifiable in the circumstances.25 This level of discretion in
relation to qualified rights is not an embarrassment to European or interna-
tional human rights law; it is inherent in both and arguably serves to
enhance the democratic legitimacy of human rights law.
26
United Nations) of both the fact of derogation and the reasons for it. ICCPR, supra note 21,
art. 4(3). Not surprisingly, states are reluctant to do so. However, the United Kingdom tried
unsuccessfully to use a similar procedure to derogate from the prohibition on arbitrary deten-
tion under the European Convention on Human Rights in the wake of the attacks of
September 11, 2001. See Alvaro Gil-Robles, Comm'r on Human Rights, Council of Eur.,
Opinion 1/2002 on Certain Aspects of the United Kingdom 2001 Derogation from Article 5
Par. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 33 (Aug. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt2002O3/jtselect/jtrights/59/5919.htm ("Whilst
acknowledging the obligation of governments to protect their citizens against the threat of
terrorism, the Commissioner is of the opinion that general appeals to an increased risk of
terrorist activity post September 11 th 2001 cannot, on their own, be sufficient to justify dero-
gating from the Convention."); see also A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2004]
UKHL 56 (holding that Section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,
which allowed for the indefinite detention of non-nationals suspected of international terror-
ism, was incompatible with the European Convention). Although there is some overlap
between qualified rights and nonderogable rights, it is not always the case that a right that is
qualified or subject to express limitations is also derogable. An example of such a right is
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion under Article 18 of the ICCPR. This fight is
subject to "such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safe-
ty, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others." ICCPR, supra
note 21, art. 18(3). However, Article 4 of the ICCPR does not permit a complete derogation
from this provision in the face of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. For
an authoritative statement of principles governing justifiable interference with qualified
rights, the interpretation of express limitations on rights, and permissible derogations, see
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1984/4
(1984) [hereinafter Siracusa Principles].
23. See ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 7. No interference with this fight is permitted in the
international human rights regime. Moreover, states may not derogate from this right, even in
the event of a "public emergency, which threatens the life of the nation." Id. art. 4.
24. Id. art. 17(1).
25. E.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18-19 (1976)
(recognizing the margin of appreciation in the context of freedom of expression). The Court
adjudicates alleged violations of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 005 (as amended
by Protocol 11, E.T.S. No. 155, and Protocol 14, C.E.T.S. No. 194) [hereinafter ECHR].
26. For a broader discussion of the democratic legitimacy of international human
rights law, see Jamie Mayerfeld, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights
[Vol. 33:215
Professional Ethics and Human Rights
Third, for the purpose of my account, human rights should be taken to
include the body of law known as international humanitarian law or the
laws of wary.2 There is, of course, some overlap between the norms of inter-
national humanitarian law and the substantive provisions of the International
Bill of Rights. For example, Common Article HI of the Geneva Conventions
(which provides the low watermark for the treatment of detainees) requires
that detainees be treated humanely, and that they be protected from, inter
alia, "cruel treatment and torture" and "outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment."28
Fourth, the primary addressees of international human rights norms are
states; they are the principal duty bearers. 29 The correlative duties on states
are threefold: to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights.30 This trichotomy
of state duties will become more significant when I articulate corresponding
duties of professionals.
Fifth, international human rights norms are not static; they constitute an
evolving body of law and practice. In addition to a plethora of regional and
international treaties expanding and elaborating on the protections found in
Law, 19 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 49 (2009) (arguing that international human rights law
is not undemocratic, because it leaves ample room for popular self-government).
27. The International Court of Justice has expressed the view that human rights norms
do not cease to apply in times of war, unless and insofar as there has been a formal deroga-
tion. The Court considers international humanitarian law (or a significant part thereof) to be
lex specialis, that is, a specialized body of law that applies during armed conflict. So in order
to determine whether a right under the ICCPR has been violated in time of war, reference
must be made to the provisions of international humanitarian law. See Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, $ 25 (July 8); Legal Conse-
quences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. 136, 178 (July 9).
28. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3(i), Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. This lan-
guage precedes and is similar to the language of the ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 10(1), and
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment pmbl., Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
29. However, it should be noted (as is often forgotten) that the preambles to both the
ICCPR, supra note 21, and the ICESCR, supra note 21, recite that "the individual, having
duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibil-
ity to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant." It is understandable that this sentence in the preambles is often overlooked, since
the remainder of these treaties and the vast body of human rights law focuses on the obliga-
tions of the state in relation to individuals over whom they have jurisdiction or control.
30. The obligation to respect human rights requires states not to violate human rights
themselves. The obligation to protect requires them to protect individuals and groups from
others who may violate their rights. The obligation to fulfill requires states to take steps to
ensure-or, in the case of obligations of progressive realization, to facilitate-the enjoyment
of human rights. U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights [OHCHR], What Are
Human Rights?, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/IssueslPageslWhatare
HumanRights.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). See also BEITZ, supra note 19, at 109 (citing
HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 60
(1996)). This tripartite articulation of states' obligations will be important when I come to
address the corresponding obligations of professionals.
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the International Bill of Rights,31 there has been a proliferation of judicial
decisions, by what Anne-Marie Slaughter has termed "the global communi-
ty of courts,' 32 interpreting the scope of human rights obligations and
protections. Since human rights law is therefore evolving over time, and the
subset of occupations considered professions is also not fixed, the relation-
ship between professionals and human rights cannot be captured by an act
of interpretive flash photography. If we are to truly understand this relation-
ship, we must continue to observe human rights norms and the professions
as they evolve.
Finally, and most importantly for the purpose of the account I advance
here, the human rights obligations of states are different in kind from other
international legal obligations that states may possess. When Country A
violates the provisions of a bilateral investment treaty with Country B, this
is a matter of concern for Country B, but generally not for other nations. By
contrast, violations of international human rights law are matters of global
concern.33 There is much evidence to substantiate this claim in international
law and practice. Pursuant to the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, perpetra-
tors of serious international crimes (including torture and crimes against
humanity, which often embody the most egregious human rights violations)
are, under international law, subject to prosecution by any country, whether
or not that country has any connection with the perpetrator, the victim, or
31. See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. AIRES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006); International Con-
vention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006).
32. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191,
192 (2003). Slaughter elaborates:
They are coming together in all sorts of ways. Literally, they meet much more fre-
quently in a variety of settings, from seminars to training sessions and judicial
organizations. Figuratively, they read and cite each other's opinions, which are
now available in these various meetings, on the Internet, through clerks, and
through the medium of international tribunals that draw on domestic case law and
then cross-fertilize to other national courts.
Id. at 192.
Cross-fertilization has been particularly evident when courts are addressing constitu-
tional and human rights issues. An exemplar in the global community is the South African
Constitutional Court, whose decisions are heavily informed and enriched by comparative
jurisprudence. To make her case, Slaughter cites a death penalty case in which the South
African Constitutional Court cites decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
of Canada, the German Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of India, the Supreme Court
of Hungary, and the Tanzanian Court of Appeal. Id. at 195 (citing State v. Makwanyane, 1995
(3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.)). As Slaughter herself recognizes, some members of the U.S. Su-
preme Court have been conspicuously more reluctant to cite the jurisprudence of foreign
courts. Id. at 200.
33. The assertion that human rights are "matters of international concern" is also cen-
tral to Beitz's thesis in THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 109.
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the crime.3 4 The fact that human rights are matters of global concern is also
reflected in the emergent notion of responsibility to protect.35 This recasts
the so-called "right" of humanitarian intervention as a responsibility of the
international community, particularly in the face of large-scale loss of life or
ethnic cleansing (actual or apprehended). 36 It is not the case that any and
every interference with a human right calls for intervention, let alone coer-
cive intervention by the international community.37 However, responsibility
to protect reflects and reinforces the notion that as the human rights viola-
tions within a state become increasingly serious and systematic, the more
compelling will be the case that sovereignty and the principle of noninter-
vention must yield to concerns for human rights.
More fundamentally, this approach supports the view that the legitima-
cy of states is dependent on human rights compliance. 38 I recognize, of
34. This phenomenon, known as universal jurisdiction, may be explained on a number
of grounds, including the Manichean rationale and the common interest rationale. See
Marks, supra note 1, at 463-65. The former rationale refers to the somewhat archaic idea
that the perpetrator of a serious international crime is hostis humanis generis (that is, an
enemy of all mankind). The latter refers to the notion articulated by Kant that similarly sur-
vives in modem human rights law-that the "peoples of the earth have ... entered in varying
degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of
rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere." IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A
Philosophical Sketch, in KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 93, 107-08 (Hans Reiss ed., 1970).
This view is reflected in the judgment of the Israeli Supreme Court in the Eichmann case,
which noted "[a]n offence against the laws of war, as a violation of the law of nations, is a
matter of general interest and concern" and "can undermine the foundations of the interna-
tional community as a whole and impair its very stability." Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann,
36 I.L.R. 277, 294-96 (1962) (Isr.).
35. See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE RE-
SPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT], available at
http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp. This report has received some endorsement from the Unit-
ed Nations. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1
(Sep. 16, 2005) (outlining the conclusions of the 2005 World Summit).
36. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 35, at 31-34.
37. See id. at xi. The reformulation makes clear (1) that this responsibility is second-
ary and comes into play when a state fails to meet its primary obligations in relation to the
human rights of those within its borders; (2) that the responsibility should be exercised in a
principled manner; (3) that there are many forms of preventive and remedial action, includ-
ing diplomatic, economic, and legal measures; and (4) that military intervention should be a
last resort. Id. at xii-xiii.
38. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD Am-
NESTY LECTURES 41, 71 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993). In his 1993 Oxford
Amnesty Lecture, John Rawls contended that human fights are "a necessary condition of a
regime's legitimacy and of the decency of its legal order." Id. (emphasis added). Rawls indi-
cates that he is referring to "human rights proper"-defined to encompass all the fights set
out in Articles 3 to 18 of the UDHR (including the fight to life, liberty, and security of person
in Article 3 and the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment in Article 5). Id. at 227-28 n.46. While Rawls incorporates the vast majority of
civil and political rights set out in the declaration (with the notable exceptions of freedom
of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right to vote), he excludes economic and
social rights such as the fight to social security (Article 22) and the right to equal pay for
equal work (Article 23) on the grounds that they "presuppose specific kinds of institutions."
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course, that the concept of legitimacy is complex and contested and is the
subject of a vast body of literature with which I cannot fully engage here.39
However, the concept of legitimacy I employ here has a few essential fea-
tures: (1) legitimacy is a scalar rather than binary proposition-there are
degrees of legitimacy; (2) in assessing the legitimacy of states (particularly
in the case of global human rights practice, as well as political rhetoric),
noncompliance with human rights is an essential factor; (3) the more wide-
spread and systematic a state's failure to comply with human rights
obligations, the less legitimate that state will be (and the more its legitimacy
will be subject to challenge); (4) in the most extreme cases of widespread
and systematic human rights violations, the state forfeits its right to the un-
impeded exercise of sovereign power within its territories and jurisdiction.
40
The erosion of a state's legitimacy in the event of serious or systematic
noncompliance with human rights is also reflected in the human rights mon-
itoring mechanisms of the international legal community. In addition to
various treaty bodies and formal monitoring mechanisms established under the
auspices of the United Nations-for example, the Human Rights Committee
4'
and the Committee Against Torturen 2-there are also several nongovernmental
organizations-such as Human Rights Watcha 3-that produce annual human
rights reports. The U.S. State Department's annual human rights report is also
premised on the idea that states systematically violating human rights under-
mine their legitimacy in the international community and jeopardize their
entitlement to foreign assistance from the United States.'
Id. When Rawls revisited the text, he reformulated the claim quoted above to assert that the
fulfillment of human rights is "a necessary condition of the decency of a society's political
institutions and of its legal order." JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 80 (1999). Despite
this reframing, the relation between human rights and legitimacy persists in the The Law of
Peoples. Id.; see also BEITZ, supra note 19, at 100 (referring to Rawls' interpretation of hu-
man rights, he notes: "We might say that human rights function as a standard of international
legitimacy.").
39. 1 draw on the discussion of legitimacy in the work of John Rawls and Charles
Beitz cited in this paragraph and the accompanying footnotes.
40. For an account of the role of the international community in the event of a state's
noncompliance with its human rights obligations, see BEITZ, supra note 19, at 122-25. As
Beitz noted in his recent critique of the account of human ights that Rawls offered in THE
LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 38, "a society whose institutions fail to honor its people's hu-
man rights cannot complain if it is condemned by world society and it makes itself
vulnerable in extremis to forceful intervention to protect human rights." BEITZ, supra note
19, at 98 (critiquing RAWLS, supra note 38).
41. Human Rights Committee, OHCHR, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
42. Committee Against Torture, OHCHR, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat
(last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
43. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT (2010), available at http://
www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/01/20/world-report-201 0.
44. For recent human rights reports by the U.S. State Department, see U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/index.htm.
The Secretary of State has a statutory mandate to transmit to the Speaker of the U.S. House
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II. PROFESSIONAL POWER AND HUMAN RIGHTS
I will now make several preliminary observations about the relationship
between professionals and human rights. I offer them as basic empirical
claims. Each claim has three components that are intended to reflect the
tripartite nature of a state's human rights obligations-that is, the obliga-
tions to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. The first claim might be
called the expertise claim. Put simply, professionals, by virtue of their ex-
pertise, may have an impact on the human rights of others. According to this
claim, professionals have expertise or skill sets that may be employed to
facilitate human rights abuses (the violative expertise claim). Similarly, pro-
fessionals have expertise or skill sets that enable them to expose, report, or
otherwise prevent human rights violations (the preventive expertise claim).
Finally, professionals have expertise or skill sets that may be employed to
promote the fulfillment of human rights (the promotive expertise claim).
Teasing the expertise claim out into these three components is important not
only because it reflects the tripartite nature of the human rights obligations
of states: professionals will often have more than one of the three kinds of
expertise, and the same body of knowledge and practical skill sets will often
be implicated by each of them; but neither proposition necessarily applies.
The second claim might be termed the access claim. This also has three
components. First, professionals have access to information and resources
that may be employed to facilitate human rights abuses (the violative access
claim). Similarly, professionals have access to information and resources
that provide them with the opportunity to expose, report, or otherwise pre-
vent human rights violations (the preventive access claim). Finally,
professionals have access to information and resources that may be em-
ployed to promote the fulfillment of human rights (the promotive access
claim). Once again, while it will frequently be the case that a professional
has more than one kind of access, it is not necessarily the case that she will
possess all three.
The third claim is the status claim. This holds that the social status of
professionals may provide license, authority, or an imprimatur of decency to
human rights violations (the violative status claim). Similarly, the social
status of professionals enables them to oppose, report, or otherwise prevent
human rights violations more authoritatively (the preventive status claim).
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate "a full and
complete [annual] report regarding the status of internationally recognized human rights" in
every country that receives foreign assistance from the United States. Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 § 16(d)(1), 22 U.S.C. § 215 1n (1982); id. § 502B, 22 U.S.C. § 2304; Trade Act of
1974 § 504, 19 U.S.C. § 2464 (1998). Lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel who endorsed
aggressive interrogation tactics also dismissed concerns about the use of these tactics that
were based on the condemnation of similar techniques in the State Department's Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices. See, e.g., Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Prin-
cipal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy
Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency 36-37 (May 30, 2005), available at http://
media.luxmedia.com/aclu/olc_05302005_bradbury.pdf.
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Finally, the social status of professionals enables them to promote more au-
thoritatively the fulfillment of human rights (the promotive status claim).
Again, it will often be the case that all three status claims apply, but it is not
necessarily the case. In addition, the extent to which each of the components
applies (in any of the three claims, expertise, access, or status) will not nec-
essarily be the same.
45
I will not seek to substantiate these empirical claims in full here because
I do not anticipate that they will be hotly contested. Examples discussed
throughout this Article should amply serve to illustrate the claims.46 The role
that professionals played in the architecture and implementation of the de-
tention and interrogation regimes in the war on terror (discussed in the
introduction and at much greater length elsewhere)47 is only the most nota-
ble. In addition, my preliminary claims are supported by statements of
several professional organizations. For example, resolutions of the Ameri-
can Psychological Association formally acknowledge that the discipline of
psychology and its practitioners may contribute to torture and other human
rights violations and that conversely they may contribute to the fulfillment
of human rights.48 Although the extent of these contributions varies among
professionals, the theory can accommodate these variations because it does
not offer a binary conception of professionals' human rights obligations.
Rather, the content of the obligations will depend upon the circumstances-
including the expertise, access, and status of each professional.
III. PROFESSIONALS AND THE STATE: RELATIONSHIPS
OF DEPENDENCE
I will now take a small step beyond the set of simple empirical claims
that professionals may-by virtue of their expertise, access, and status-
45. Although none of the claims directly invokes the notion of public trust, it is clearly
implicated. For example, the access and social status some professionals possess may well be
due to the level of trust that the public places (or certain publics place) in those profession-
als.
46. See the discussion of the role of physicians, psychologists, and lawyers in the
Bush administration's interrogation regime discussed in the Introduction; see also the more
positive examples offered below, Parts IV.C and IV.D.
47. See, e.g., STEVEN H. MILES, OATH BETRAYED: AMERICA'S TORTURE DOCTORS
(2009); PHILLIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF
AMERICAN VALUES (2009); Marks, supra note 11.
48. See, e.g., Opposition to Torture, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N (1986),
http://www.apa.org/about/governance/council/policy/chapter- 1 4.aspx#opposition-torture (last
visited Feb. 7, 2012) (acknowledging that "psychological knowledge and techniques may be
used to design and carry out torture" and that "torture victims may suffer from long-term,
multiple psychological and physical problems"); Human Rights, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N
(1987), http://www.apa.org/about/govemancelcouncil/policy/chapter-14.aspx#human-rights (last
visited Feb. 7, 2012) (discussing how "the discipline of psychology, and the academic and
professional activities [of] psychologists, are relevant for securing and maintaining human
rights").
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facilitate human rights violations, prevent them, and contribute to the ful-
fillment of those rights. My next claim, which I call the professional
dependence claim, is that states cannot meet their international human rights
obligations without the participation of professionals. Put another way,
states need and depend upon professionals for human rights compliance.
Although states may be able to satisfy some human rights obligations with-
out the assistance of professionals, there are several core obligations for
which professionals' assistance is essential. One obvious example from the
laws of war is the obligation to provide medical care for the wounded and
sick pursuant to Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions. 49 This ob-
ligation clearly cannot be satisfied without the assistance of physicians and
other health professionals. Similarly, states cannot ensure that defendants to
criminal proceedings or aliens facing deportation have access to appropriate
legal representation unless there are lawyers able and willing to provide this
service.50 Beyond the paradigm cases of law and medicine, freedom of ex-
pression in Article 19 of the ICCPR includes the freedom not only to
"impart information and ideas of all kinds" but also freedom to "seek" and
"receive" such information and ideas.5 It has long been recognized that the
fulfillment of this right requires a free press,52 and although the internet has
transformed the accessibility of information, journalists are still vital to the
fulfillment of that right. 53 More narrowly, states cannot satisfy other more
specific obligations without journalists-consider, for example, their obliga-
tion under the Torture Convention to investigate allegations of torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 4 The need for investigative journal-
ism is most acute where detainees are held in secret locations or where their
detention is concealed from the Red Cross, as in the case of the CIA's
"black sites" and "ghost prisoners" in the war on terror.
5
The professional dependence claim asserts that states depend on profes-
sionals in order to comply systematically with their human rights
49. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art. 3(2).
50. On the rights of criminal defendants to legal assistance, see ICCPR, supra note 21,
art. 14(3)(d). See also U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC], General Comment No. 32, Article
14: Right to Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 1 10, 38, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007) (noting that the "availability or absence of legal assistance
often determines whether or not a person can access the relevant proceedings or participate
in them in a meaningful way"). On the rights of aliens facing deportation to representation
before a competent authority, see ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 13.
51. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 19(2).
52. See, e.g., HRC, General Comment No. 34, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression,
13, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/GC/34 (Sep. 12, 2011) (replacing General Comment No. 10 (1983),
but drawing similar conclusions about the essential need for a free press).
53. Id. [44.
54. Torture Convention, supra note 28, art. 12 (obliging states to proceed with a
prompt and impartial investigation where there are reasonable grounds to believe that an act
of torture has occurred within its jurisdiction).
55. Umansky, supra note 10, at 28-29.
Winter 2012]
Michigan Journal of International Law
obligations. 56 Since the legitimacy of states depends, in part, on such com-
pliance, this dependence claim may be articulated in an even stronger form:
the legitimacy of a state depends, in part, on the assistance of professionals
in the performance of the state's human rights obligations. Put simply, the
legitimacy of states depends on professionals.
However, the relationship between the state and professionals is not a
one-way street. Professionals are, in turn, dependent upon the state. This
leads me to my next claim, the state dependence claim. Professionals de-
pend on states, and on the privileges and protections conferred by them, in
order to conduct their professional practices. Although every professional
need not be dependent upon the state for the exercise of every aspect of her
professional practice, the state provides protections and privileges that are
vital to the performance of core elements of each of the professions.
If you ask me to write you a prescription for Prozac, I would be forced
to decline. I am not a physician. With few exceptions, physicians have a
monopoly on prescribing powers.57 It is a monopoly that states protect, in
part, by criminalizing and prosecuting the prescription of pharmaceuticals
by anyone who is not a licensed physician. Ask me instead to represent you
before the U.K. Supreme Court, the new final court of appeal in the United
Kingdom for civil cases,5 8 and I might be able to do so (assuming the case
was within my expertise) because I hold a "practising certificate" from the
Bar Council of England and Wales. In most jurisdictions in the developed
world, only qualified legal professionals may represent parties in court pro-
ceedings and charge their clients a fee for doing so.59 Unqualified persons
56. In my view, the professional dependence claim is--on its own--capable of gener-
ating a normative claim about the human rights obligations of the state, whether or not the
state is a liberal democracy. Given the dependence of the state on professionals for human
rights compliance, the state has an obligation to ensure that the ability of professionals to
respect, protect, and promote human rights is itself respected, protected, and promoted. This
obligation has practical implications similar to those I outline in my discussion of the human
rights obligations of professionals in Part V below. For example, states should create and
maintain whistleblower protections that allow and encourage professionals to act as guardi-
ans of human rights. They should also expressly articulate the human rights obligations of
professionals as part of licensure. However, the claim does not fully account for the human
rights obligations of professionals absent such an express articulation. This is the work done
by the contractarian account of professional human rights obligations that I advance in Part
IV below.
57. Psychologists currently have prescribing rights in New Mexico, Louisiana, and
Guam. William A. Rae, Prescription Privileges for Psychologists: Opinions of Pediatric
Psychologists and Pediatricians, 33 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 176, 176 (2008). For a critique of
psychologists' prescribing rights, see William N. Robiner et al., Prescriptive Authority for
Psychologists: A Looming Health Hazard?, 9 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 231, 231-48 (2002).
58. THE SUPREME COURT (U.K.), http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/the-supreme-
court.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
59. Some common law countries permit litigants without legal representation to re-
ceive reasonable assistance from a layperson, sometimes called a McKenzie friend. See
McKenzie v. McKenzie [1970] 3 W.L.R. 472 (A.C.) (Eng.).
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holding themselves out as lawyers are ordinarily liable to prosecution.6"
Moving away from the paradigm cases of law and medicine, journalists are
also only able to do their jobs because of a variety of privileges and protec-
tions. Admittedly, some of those privileges are provided by nonstate actors
(for example, reduced or no-cost admission to certain events for journalists
holding press passes) and some are provided for in international law-most
notably, the protections conferred on journalists by the laws of war.6 Alt-
hough these latter protections are not dependent upon identity cards being
issued by the appropriate state, these cards provide proof of status that may
be essential in the event of arrest or capture. 62 In addition, journalists are
afforded many protections and privileges by states during peacetime-for
example, press passes issued by police departments and legal (sometimes
constitutional) protections for journalists' sources.
63
Just as states depend on professionals for their legitimacy (and, in turn,
for the right to the unimpeded exercise of their sovereign powers), so pro-
fessionals depend upon states for the unimpeded performance of their
practice. Of course, a state's legitimacy does not depend solely upon profes-
sionals' assistance in the performance of its human rights obligations. Nor is
each and every element of professional practice dependent upon the privi-
leges and protections conferred by the state. But states and their
professionals are each dependent on the other in one or more ways essential
to each of them. This relationship of mutual dependence might also be char-
acterized as a relationship of reciprocal legitimacy in which each party
60. See, e.g., N.Y. Jud. Law § 478 (McKinney 2005) (making it unlawful for a person
to hold himself out as a lawyer without being licensed and admitted to the bar).
61. There are two categories of protected journalists: (1) war correspondents
accredited to the armed forces of a party to the conflict, who are entitled to prisoner of
war status under the Geneva Conventions, Third Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art.
4(A)(4); and (2) freelance journalists who are entitled to protection as civilians, Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflict art. 79, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter First Additional Protocol]. See generally INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 917-24 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987), available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750102?OpenDocument. Although the United States has
not yet ratified the First Additional Protocol, its practice in recent conflicts respects these
provisions. See 2 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 664, IT 28-29 (2005). It has also been argued that
there is a rule of customary international law to similar effect. See l id. at 115-18.
62. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art. 4(A)(4); cf First Additional Proto-
col, supra note 61, art. 79(3) (stating that journalists "may obtain an identity card" from "the
government of the State of which the journalist is a national or in whose territory he resides
or in which the news medium employing him is located"). The Commentary to Article 79
states that "the relevant States (insofar as they are Parties to Protocol I) have an obligation to
issue such cards to journalists once the conditions are fulfilled." See INT'L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, supra note 61, at 923, $ 3274.
63. See generally DAVID BANISAR, SILENCING SOURCES: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY
OF PROTECTIONS AND THREATS TO JOURNALISTS' SOURCES (2007) (providing a multinational
review of source protection laws).
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relies upon the other in an essential way for its legitimacy as well as its re-
lated ability to perform core functions.'
IV. THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF PROFESSIONALS
A. The Foundations of the Contract
The mutual dependence of states and professionals on one another leads
me to my central claim: the interdependent contract claim. The claim is de-
rived from social contract theory.65 Although the version of the contract I
propose here is novel, the use of social contract theory more broadly to jus-
tify and elaborate upon the ethical obligations of professionals is not new.
Thirty years ago, the medical ethicist Robert Veatch articulated an influen-
tial triple contract theory of professional ethics that explicitly applies to all
professions, not just medicine.66 In Veatch's model, the first contract is the
basic social contract, "whereby the moral community comes together to
articulate the basic ethical system" for a society.67 In the second contract,
the collective lay-professional contract, professionals and lay participants
within the society define "the basic moral norms of the lay-professional re-
lation."61 This second contract is constrained by the norms of the first.6 9 The
third contract is the individual lay-professional contract-whether physi-
cian-patient, lawyer-client, or some other professional relation-in which
"within the constraints of these two earlier agreements, the individual pro-
fessional and lay person would be free to set personal moral limits on their
relations.
' 70
64. In considering this claim and the discussion in Part IV that follows, I invite the
reader to focus again on the paradigm case, a liberal democracy where the institutions of
government and the professions are not wholly dysfunctional. I will say something more
about other cases below.
65. See generally Ann Cudd, Contractarianism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fal12008/entries/contractarianism (providing a brief introduction to social contract theory
with a focus on the contractarian strain).
66. ROBERT VEATCH, THE PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATION 28-32 (1991) (summarizing
Veatch's triple contract theory as articulated in ROBERT VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL
ETHICS 108-38 (1981)).
67. Id. at 29-31.
68. Id. at 30.
69. See id. at 30-31.
70. Id. at 31. Veatch illustrates the dependent nature of the three contracts in his sche-
ma, contending (by way of example) that "if the basic social contract contained a norm that
prohibited killing of the innocent, and because of that the second contract prohibited physi-
cian killing for mercy, then individual patients and physicians would not be able to agree to a
mercy-killing contract." Id. However, it is not clear from the example that the basic social
contract necessarily requires the provision against mercy-killing in the second contract. The
basic social contract might be interpreted in such a way as to permit such a constraint in the
second contract but not require it (for example, by prohibiting the killing of "the innocent"
only if it is done without their consent). See id. at 30-31.
[Vol. 33:215
Professional Ethics and Human Rights
This complex structure of interrelated contracts should arguably be
supplemented by another contract that would sit above the basic social
contract within a society, and serve to constrain it. That contract would
incorporate fundamental norms of the international community such as
those found in the core protections of human rights law. If certain behaviors
are constrained by international law, the basic social contract should
similarly not permit them,7 and they (in turn) should not be permissible in
the collective or individual lay-professional contracts. However, given the
relationship of mutual dependence and reciprocal legitimacy between
professionals and the state, I offer a simpler and more demanding account.
72
In my view, this relationship provides a solid basis for a direct contract
between professionals and the state.73 The obligations of professionals under
this contract may be characterized as follows. In exchange for the state's
provision of the privileges and protections necessary for the full
performance of the professional's practice, the professional-in return-
undertakes to exercise her professional skill and judgment to assist the state
with the performance of its human rights obligations. To support this claim,
I will draw upon some legal analogies.
Since the legitimacy of a state is dependent, in part, upon the assistance
of professionals in the performance of the state's human rights obligations,
the privileges and protections for professional practice must necessarily be
granted in exchange for the promise I have articulated-at the very least, in
the absence of express provision to the contrary.7 4 Readers with some
knowledge of Anglo-American principles of contract law will know that terms
are often implied into contracts even though neither party has formally ex-
pressed them.75 The criteria that need to be satisfied before courts imply a term
into a written agreement have been formulated (and reformulated) in various
71. International legal norms are often implemented or reflected in domestic legal
norms. For example, the prohibition on torture in the ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 7, and in the
Torture Convention, supra note 28, art. 2, is reflected in the criminalization of torture in U.S.
law, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A.
72. Veatch acknowledges that his framework would leave "substantial latitude" to
professionals, giving them discretion to act "according to [their] personal beliefs and values."
ROBERT VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 134 (1981). The account I offer here would
provide greater constraints.
73. The nature of the state as a party to the contract also differentiates my account
from most social contract accounts of moral order (including Veatch's), which tend to focus
on "society" rather than the state. E.g., id. at 127 (referring to the "contract between society
and professionals").
74. I discuss in Part V whether such provision might be made and what its implica-
tions would be.
75. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 483-88, § 7.16 (4th ed. 2004) (dis-
cussing the process by, and circumstances in, which a court supplies a term to a contract).
For a more detailed discussion of the same issues, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH
ON CONTRACTS ch. 7 (3d ed. 2003).
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ways.76 However, one formulation is that the implied term must be "nec-
essary to give business efficacy to the contract."77 One might say, with
regard to the social contract I have advanced here, that (from the state's
perspective) efficacy is tied to the "business" of legitimate governance.
But it is important not to obsess about the word "business" here; its pur-
pose, in the legal test, is merely to direct the court to consider the
practical consequences of the contract with and without the implied term.
This approach may provide an analogical tool to support the interdepend-
ent contract claim I advance here. In particular, it is inefficacious for the
state to grant privileges and protections to professionals without, in return,
procuring a commitment on the part of the professionals to assist the state
with the performance of human rights obligations that are essential to the
legitimacy of the state. The uniform incorporation of this obligation into the
contract between the state and its professionals is also efficacious from the
point of view of the professional because it operates to preserve the legiti-
macy of the state from which she derives her professional privileges. This
benefit may have real and significant practical implications, particularly
when the professional seeks to engage with colleagues, clients, or funding
bodies outside her state.
A second analogy comes not from legal principles of contract
construction, but from the canons of statutory interpretation. When choosing
between multiple plausible interpretations, courts tend to construe norm-
generating acts of state institutions to be consistent with the international
legal commitments of the state.78 For example, unless a statute is on its face
inconsistent with the international legal obligations of the state, the court
will construe the provisions of the statute to be consistent with those
obligations.79 The assumption is that the state intends to comply with its
international commitments, absent express indication to the contrary. These
principles of contract construction and statutory interpretation should not be
applied mechanistically to the social contract between the state and
76. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of Belize v. Belize Telecom Ltd. [2009] UKPC 10, [16]-
[27] (appeal taken from Belize) (U.K.) (discussing various formulations of the test for the
implication of a term into a contract at common law).
77. Id. at [19] (quoting Trollope & Colls Ltd. v. Nw. Metro. Reg'l Hosp. Bd. [1973] 1
W.L.R. 601, 609 (H.L.) (Eng.)).
78. See FRANCIS BENNION, BENNION ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION § 270 (5th ed.
2008) (stating that the "municipal law should conform to international law").
79. See, e.g., Roodal v. Trinidad & Tobago [2003] UKPC 78 [29]-[30] (appeal taken
from Trin. & Tobago). A similar canon of construction is applied by courts in the United
States, where it is known as the Charming Betsy doctrine, after the Supreme Court case of
the same name (although this was not the first case in which the doctrine was invoked). Mur-
ray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains. ); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 114 (1987) ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be con-
strued so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the
United States.").
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professionals that I advance here. Rather, I offer these doctrines, premised
on notions of necessity and consistency, by way of analogical support for
the interdependent contract claim I make here. They demonstrate that the
novelty of this account is found not so much in the contractarian approach"
as in the nature and content of the professional obligation derived from the
contract.
B. The Nature of the Duty
To understand the nature and content of the professional obligation en-
tailed by this approach, we must return briefly to my preliminary claims
tying professionals' expertise, access, and social status to their ability to
violate human rights, prevent human rights violations, and promote the ful-
fillment of human rights. These claims help provide content to the
obligation. In return for granting professionals the privileges and protections
necessary for them to exercise their professional practice, professionals
promise the state they will do what they reasonably can-by virtue of their
expertise, access, and status-to ensure the state is able to meet its interna-
tional human rights obligations. What this requires of any professional will
depend on the nature of the expertise, access, and status that the profession-
al possesses. Expertise, access, and status will vary within each profession,
as well as between professions.
To explore how demanding this duty may be, it is helpful to distinguish
it from the duty Amartya Sen articulates in his quest for a general theory of
human rights. Sen contends that human fights provide a "reason for action
to help another person, ' 81 but concedes that he would be making a great leap
if this reason for action gave rise to "an absolute obligation to undertake that
action, no matter what values one has and what other commitments one has
reason to consider."82 As Sen frames it, the duty is "to give reasonable con-
sideration to undertaking such an action. '83 This is, Sen contends, "not an
agreement to tie oneself up in hopeless knots,' 84 but rather to "consider seri-
ously what one should do, taking note of the relevant parameters of the
cases involved."85 Sen elaborates on the content of this obligation for those
who find themselves bystanders to human rights violations:
80. See, e.g., David Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should
Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 269, 290-91 (1996). In
this response to William Simon and David Luban, Wilkins argues that the lawyer's oath to
support and defend the law (in order to gain admission to the bar) constitutes a "voluntary
agreement with society," but that even without the oath, "the regulatory structure that permits
lawyers to exercise rights and privileges unavailable to ordinary citizens rests on an implicit
commitment to legality emanating from the profession as a whole." Id.
81. Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315,
338 (2004).
82. Id. at 339.
83. Id. at 338-39.
84. Id. at 339.
85. Id. at 340.
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The recognition of human rights is not an insistence that everyone
everywhere rises to help prevent every violation of every human
right no matter where it occurs. It is, rather, an acknowledgment
that if one is in a plausible position to do something effective in
preventing the violation of such a right, then one does have an obli-
gation to consider doing just that. It is still possible that other
obligations or non-obligational concerns may overwhelm the rea-
son for the particular action in question, but that reason cannot be
simply brushed away as being "none of one's business." Loosely
specified obligations must not be confused with no obligations at
all. 6
To clarify the nature of this obligation, Sen draws on Kant's distinction
between "perfect" and "imperfect" obligations.8 7 The would-be torturer and
the murderer have perfect obligations; they are, he contends, "obviously
quite straightforward, to wit, to refrain and desist."88 In the case of bystand-
ers, however, the obligation is less fully specified. It is imperfect, and there
can be "serious debates" about
(i) the ways in which the attention that is owed to human rights
should be best paid, (ii) how the different types of human rights
should be weighed against each other and their respective demands
integrated together, (iii) how the claims of human rights should be
consolidated with other evaluative concerns that may also deserve
ethical attention, and so on.89
Sen contends that this contextual variability is "not an embarrassment"
in a discussion of human rights as an ethical claim, and that one can find
similar diversity in the articulation and application of other ethical theo-
ries. 90
The first two areas of variability Sen identifies are certainly not an em-
barrassment for human rights in a legal sense; on the contrary, they are
86. Id. at 340-41. In AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 372-73 (2009), Sen phrases
the obligation in the following way: "The basic general obligation must be to consider seri-
ously what one can reasonably do to help the realization of another person's freedom, taking
note of its importance and influenceability, and of one's own circumstances and likely effec-
tiveness." Sen reiterates in this later work that if one is in a position to do something effective
to prevent the violation of a right, that creates a "good reason" to intervene, which cannot be
dismissed simply as being "none of one's business." Id. at 373.
87. Sen, supra note 81, at 321 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL
REASON (1788)); see also SEN, supra note 86, at 374; cf MICHAEL PERRY, TOWARD A THEO-
RY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 33 (2007) (preferring the distinction between "determinate" and
"indeterminate" duties).
88. Sen, supra note 81, at 321; see also SEN, supra note 86, at 376.
89. Sen, supra note 81, at 322.
90. See also SEN, supra note 86, at 386 (observing that "discussion, disputation and
argument... is indeed the nature of the discipline" of human rights).
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intrinsic to international human rights law and practice. 9' Leaving to one
side the case of absolute, nonderogable rights (such as the prohibition on
torture), there are rich debates about qualified rights-in particular, the cir-
cumstances and manner in which states may interfere with them, and how
competing qualified rights should be negotiated. This debate is reflected and
embodied in the jurisprudence of courts addressing allegations of human
rights violations. 92 As I have already mentioned, the European Court of
Human Rights' doctrine includes the concept of margin of appreciation,
giving some deference to states' determinations of how attention should be
best paid to qualified human rights and how different and competing rights
should be reconciled.
93
Given the room for maneuver accorded to states in their compliance
with human rights obligations, it is logical that my account incorporates a
similar sphere of autonomy for the concomitant human rights obligations of
professionals. Where international human rights law imposes a perfect obli-
gation on states not to violate an absolute right, my account gives rise to a
similar obligation on the part of professionals. Where the human rights obli-
gation on the state is imperfect (or not fully determined), the professional's
sphere of autonomy is greater. The professional has some discretion as to
how to resolve the first two "debates" Sen identifies-that is, the best ways
in which to pay attention to human rights, and how competing rights should
be negotiated. But my account is less permissive than Sen's with regard to
the third sphere of debate: balancing human rights with competing "evalua-
tive concerns." Under the interdependent contract, professionals have a
prima facie obligation to give primacy to human rights over other concerns.
A prima facie obligation is, of course, not absolute, but it creates a presump-
tion that must be rebutted, and that imposes an important cognitive burden.
In Sen's weaker formulation, it is extremely doubtful that the obligation
would create a sufficiently weighty demand on professionals to ensure that
states act in compliance with their human rights obligations-particularly, in
extremis when emotions are running high and human rights violations are
most likely, as may well be the case in the wake of a mainland terror attack or
91. See BEITZ, supra note 19, at 107-09 (arguing that a practical conception of human
rights must rely on a model that "should allow for the possibility that disagreement of certain
kinds may be integral to the practice rather than signs of failure or incompleteness in the
model").
92. For a detailed discussion of these issues in relation to a variety of rights, see, for
example, 1 THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS pt. 2 (Richard Clayton & Hugh Tomlinson eds., 2d
ed. 2009).
93. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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a public health emergency.9 4 In such cases, the stronger obligation I articu-
late here will be vital. 95
C. Paradigm Professions: Some Examples
Some examples may be instructive in order to demonstrate how the ob-
ligation I have articulated might play out in practice. I will use actual events
rather than hypotheticals where I can. In each case, the central question will
be: What can the professional reasonably do to ensure the state meets its
human rights obligations (obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human
rights) taking into account the expertise of the professional, her access to
information and resources, and her status? The role of the professional may
determine the degree of access to information and resources. For example, a
military physician at Abu Ghraib who has observed firsthand evidence of
detainee abuse during a clinical examination has a level of access that a
family doctor reading about such abuses in the New York Times does not
have. The content and implications of the relevant ethical obligation of the
military physician will therefore be weightier and different in kind than that
of the family doctor. We should expect the military physician to report these
abuses in both the military and medical chain of command and, if she is
rebuffed, we might also expect her to bring her concerns to the attention of
relevant external bodies. This is more than we would be entitled to expect
from the family doctor reading allegations of abuse in his newspaper. How-
ever, we might reasonably expect the family doctor to pursue a different
course of action--either individually or collectively with others-for exam-
ple, by writing a letter to his local newspaper or to a medical professional
association (even if he is not a member).
Although the professional's role may shape the content of the obliga-
tion,96 the existence of the duty transcends roles. It cannot be excluded by
any professional relationship. This is because the duty arises from the rela-
tionship between the professional and the state that is constitutive of the
professional's status qua professional. As a result, any professional role-
including one arising from an employer-employee relationship between the
state and the professional-is necessarily constrained by this obligation.
A related example should help illustrate this point. In the summer of
2003, the conditions at the Abu Ghraib prison were terrible; there was
94. See also Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 = ?: What Counts in Counterter-
rorism, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 559, 584-88 (2006) (providing a more detailed
discussion of the way in which emotional responses can exacerbate cognitive biases and lead
to counterterrorism policies that violate human rights).
95. In addition to improving human rights compliance and preserving the legitimacy
of the state, there may be other benefits too, such as more effective policies to address the
threat to national security or public health. For further discussion, see id.
96. I return to the relevance of role in Part V.
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severe overcrowding and a lack of adequate health care.97 Conditions were
so bad that they led the detainees to revolt. 98 Among the many inadequacies
at Abu Ghraib was the lack of psychiatric care. By one very conservative
estimate, roughly five percent of the detainee population at Abu Ghraib
(which numbered in excess of 7000 in late 2003 and early 2004) was men-
tally ill.99 An Army physician and an Army psychologist visited the prison
only once a week. Moreover, the physician was not a psychiatrist, and he
lacked the necessary experience and expertise to prescribe powerful anti-
psychotic drugs. During one of his weekly visits, the physician was
informed that one of the mentally ill detainees (apparently one of the most
seriously ill) kept stripping off his clothes and smashing his head against the
wall. Handcuffs and a helmet had failed to stop him, and there were no
straitjackets. Some soldiers suggested using a leash. Unable to think of an-
other option, the physician agreed to the plan.100
In November 2003, a psychiatrist, Scott Uithol, finally arrived at Abu
Ghraib. But he was not tasked with ensuring that detainees received the psy-
chiatric care they desperately needed."° ' Instead, he was assigned to the
behavioral science consultation team (BSCT, known colloquially as "Bis-
cuit") and charged with advising interrogators how to create psychological
stress for detainees. This role was problematic for reasons discussed else-
where. 102 But whatever Uithol's role, whatever the reason for his assignment
to Abu Ghraib (for example, if he had been tasked with providing psychiat-
ric support for soldiers suffering from PTSD, as he may have originally
anticipated), he had a professional ethical obligation to address the viola-
tions of the detainees' human rights. Uithol had access to the detainees at
Abu Ghraib, and he should have insisted that his primary obligation was
to meet their desperate psychiatric needs, since the lack of adequate medi-
cal care put the United States in breach of its fundamental obligations
under human rights law and the laws of war.1"3 Alternatively, he should
97. See MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH
MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 25 (2004), available at http://www.npr.org/iraql2004/prison-
abusejreport.pdf [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT].
98. See id. at 27-31 (providing summary of 2003 riots).
99. M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H. Marks, Opinion, Triage at Abu Ghraib, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/02/04/opinion/04iht-edbloche.html. Contempo-
rary reports record that the peak population at Abu Ghraib exceeded 7000 detainees at this
time. See, e.g., Scott Higham, Josh White & Christian Davenport, A Prison on the Brink:
Usual Military Checks and Balances Went Missing, WASH. POST, May 9, 2004, at AO1.
100. Bloche & Marks, supra note 99. This may have been the inspiration for the iconic
image (taken several weeks later) of Lynndie England holding a detainee on a leash. See
Worth a Thousand Words, MSNBC (May 13, 2004, 9:15 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/4964024.
101. M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H. Marks, Op-Ed, Doctor's Orders-Spill Your Guts,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/O9/opinion/op-brutality9.
102. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 11, at 728-29.
103. See supra notes 27, 28, 49 and accompanying text; see also Body of Principles for
the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res.
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have insisted that the Defense Department immediately provide other psy-
chiatric personnel to address the detainees' urgent mental health needs.
The theory I have proposed here has at least one further implication for
BSCT psychiatrists like Scott Uithol-even if they had not been asked to
ramp up interrogation stressors in violation of international human rights
law and the laws of war. If they had only been asked to assist in some way
with lawful rapport-building interrogations, and several other psychiatrists
had been tasked with providing (and were capable of providing) adequate
psychiatric care to the detainees, the human rights content of Uithol's pro-
fessional ethical obligations should still have given him pause for thought. If
the detention environment was in other ways systemically violative of inter-
national human rights law or the laws of war (as I and others have
contended), the psychiatrist would need to consider whether his contribution
to the interrogation mission (while seemingly lawful when considered in
isolation) was part and parcel of a profoundly violative detention regime.
For that reason alone, the psychiatrist could have declined-and, many phy-
sicians have since argued, should have declined-to participate even in
nonaggressive interrogations. 104 A similar position is reflected in a success-
ful ballot resolution of the members of the American Psychological
Association in September 2008. The resolution provides that
psychologists may not work in settings where persons are held out-
side of, or in violation of, either International Law (e.g., the UN
Convention Against Torture and the Geneva Conventions) or the
US Constitution (where appropriate), unless they are working di-
rectly for the persons being detained or for an independent third
party working to protect human rights.
10 5
Let us explore another example, this time from law. Consider the law-
yers in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) who
drafted the so-called torture memos. I will not explore these memoranda in
detail here, nor exhaustively chart the grounds on which they may be criti-
cized. However, as a number of commentators have argued persuasively,
these lawyers should have given impartial advice. 10 6 Pursuant to the obliga-
43/173 princ. 24, U.N. Doc. AIRES/43/173 (Dec. 9. 1988) (requiring the provision of free
medical care and treatment to all detainees).
104. The position ultimately adopted by the American Psychiatric Association in 2006
and, a few weeks later, by the American Medical Association was that physicians should not
participate in interrogations even in lawful detention environments because this also under-
mines public trust in physicians and their role as healers. Documents obtained by Gregg
Bloche and me under the Freedom of Information Act revealed that, contrary to the policies
adopted by these professional associations, the Army continued to train psychiatrists to serve
in these roles. Jonathan H. Marks & M. Gregg Bloche, The Ethics of Interrogation-The U.S.
Military's Ongoing Use of Psychiatrists, 359 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1090, 1090 (2008).
105. 2008 APA Petition Resolution Ballot, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, http://
www.apa.org/news/press/statements/work-settings. aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
106. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 4, at 162-63; SANDS, supra note 47, at 73-77; David
Cole, The Torture Memos: The Case Against the Lawyers, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 8, 2009, at
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tion I describe here, this advice should also have included a balanced analy-
sis of whether the detention and interrogation regimes operated individually
or jointly by the military and the CIA were compliant with the United
States' international human rights obligations. Lawyers should not have
drafted memos designed to insulate interrogators from legal liability for
human rights violations, thereby paving the way for such violations. Nor
should they have participated in the construction of a legal edifice conceal-
ing the ongoing nature of interrogation practices that violated human
rights-as they did in 2004-2005, when a publicized memo appearing to
indicate the OLC had adopted a more restrictive approach was shortly fol-
lowed by three secret and more permissive ones.
10 7
The account I offer here also has something to say about a lawyer's ob-
ligations to those who are not yet her clients. 108 International human rights
law provides, among other things, that anyone deprived of his liberty by
arrest or detention has the right to challenge the detention in court, 109 that
criminal defendants have rights to legal assistance, 110 and that the law must
protect individuals from unlawful interference with a number of other
rights. "' The full realization of these rights requires (either expressly or im-
plicitly) legal representation, or at least the entitlement to legal
representation. In countries where such representation is not provided by the
state-either adequately or at all-the obligation articulated here would
require lawyers with relevant expertise to set aside time from their remuner-
ated practice to provide pro bono legal services to those unable to purchase
them. 112 A number of lawyers in the United States have clearly done this, by
14, available at http://www.nybooks.con/articles/archives/2009/oct/08/the-torture-memos-
the-case-against-the-lawyers/?pagination=false.
107. See Cole, supra note 106.
108. Compare Greenstein, supra note 17, at 349 (criticizing legal professional ethics
for its "nearly exclusive" focus on the client), with Martha Davis, Human Rights and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Intersections and Integration, 42 COLuM. HuM. RTS.
L. REV. 157, 185 (2010) (arguing that the American Bar Association (ABA) should incorpo-
rate a human rights lens into its ongoing process for reviewing professional ethical
standards).
109. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 9(3).
110. Id. art. 14.
111. See, e.g., id. art. 17 (right to privacy).
112. The notion that lawyers should do pro bono work is hardly novel, although in the
United States it is rarely tied expressly to human rights. For example, ABA Model Rule 6.1
provides that "[e]very lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to
those unable to pay." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2009), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/rule61.html. The commentary to Rule 6.1 rec-
ognizes that law firms have a role to play, and states that they "should act reasonably to ena-
enable and encourage all lawyers in the firm to provide pro bono legal services called for by
this Rule." Id. cmt. The rule states that every lawyer should "aspire to render at least (50)
hours of pro bono publico legal services per year" and should devote a "substantial majority"
of that time to the provision of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to "persons of
limited means or ... charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational
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taking considerable time out of their practice to represent detainees at Guan-
tanamo Bay.1' 3 The efforts of others who participated in drafting American
Bar Association policy documents, and used their legal expertise and skills
to critique violations of human rights law and constitutional norms in the
detention and interrogation regimes in the war on terror, also contributed to
the satisfaction of the obligation I have articulated.114
D. Penumbral Professions: A Practical Approach
For journalists, the obligation I have articulated would at the very least
require that priority be given to stories about violations of human rights.
Although limited resources may often (and increasingly) constrain investi-
gative journalism, many important steps can be taken at no or minimal
cost-for example, issuing Freedom of Information Act requests. Allega-
tions of human rights violations should be thoroughly investigated, and the
resulting story should be given a priority and placement (whether in print or
broadcast media) that reflects the importance of human rights violations,
both in their own right and as corrosive of the legitimacy of states.
Many more examples can be found in other professions too. Since I
cannot explore them all here, I will address how, in principle, my account
applies outside the paradigm professions. Penumbral cases would include,
for example, a massage therapist or certified dental assistant. It is tempting
organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of
limited means." Id.
113. Farah Stockman, Lawyers Make Huge Pro Bono Effort for Guantdnamo Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/02/world/americas/O2iht-legal
.5.14179947.html (reporting that one firm alone had provided 35,448 billable hours of legal
help to Guantanamo Bay detainees, worth an estimated $17 million).
114. A skeptic might offer as a counterexample that the conduct of a lawyer could po-
tentially contribute to human rights violations. She might have in mind the lawyer who
defends an alleged torturer, terrorist, or perpetrator of other serious human rights violations.
The strongest response to such a contention is, of course, that the right to a fair trial is itself a
fundamental human right, and one to which the alleged perpetrator of human rights viola-
tions is no less entitled. So the lawyer who zealously defends the alleged perpetrator of
human rights violations enables the state to fulfill its human rights obligations in relation to
that defendant. However, while the lawyer may zealously defend her client, she should not
act in a manner contrary to applicable codes of ethics-a constraint that applies whether the
defendant is alleged to have committed a simple misdemeanor or a serious international
crime.
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010), the Supreme Court
held that the provision of certain professional services to a formally designated foreign ter-
rorist organization (including training on how to petition the United Nations for
humanitarian relief) would be prohibited by the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
(2010). See 130 S. Ct at 2720-24. A discussion of the many implications of this decision is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, the statute has not been interpreted as preventing
a lawyer from defending an alleged terrorist in criminal proceedings as described above. To
the extent that the Supreme Court's decision (or its progeny) might in other ways constrain
the ability of legal professionals to facilitate the state's performance of its human rights obli-
gations, I would argue that legal professionals have an obligation individually (acting on
their own behalf) and collectively to call for an amendment to the material support statute.
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to deal with penumbral professions by asking whether the proposed occupa-
tion is truly a profession. This is one possible approach, and certainly a
logical one, but it would invite a detailed review of the complex literature on
professions and professionalism. A simpler approach, however, is to pose as
questions the conditions I set out in this Article as providing the foundations
for my account.1 5
The first question would be: Does the putative professional possess ex-
pertise, access, and status (by virtue of her training and occupation) that
could facilitate the violation, protection, or promotion of human rights? The
second question would be: If so, is the assistance of that kind of profession-
al necessary for the state to meet its international human rights obligations?
The third question would be: Does the state grant the putative professional
privileges and protections that are necessary for the full exercise of her pro-
fessional practice? If the answer to each of these three questions is yes, the
conditions precedent for the generation of the obligation described here
have been satisfied. 1 16 What an individual member of that profession may be
required to do in any particular case will depend, as in the case of the para-
digm professions, on the circumstances of the case, and on the expertise, the
access, and the status that the professional possesses.
E. Collective Obligations
To recap briefly, the obligation I have articulated applies to profession-
als, whether they are inside or outside government, whatever their role. The
obligation also applies both within and outside the clinical paradigm of any
profession-so it speaks to what the physician should do both in the con-
sulting room and in the public sphere. Where human rights law yields a
perfect obligation not to violate a right, the professional obligation arising in
my account is similarly a perfect one: whatever the professional's role, she
must similarly not violate that right. Where human rights law yields an im-
perfect obligation, the professional still has a prima facie obligation to give
primacy to human rights considerations. Although the obligation is role
transcendent (such that no role excludes the prima facie duty), the role may
nonetheless enhance or constrain what the professional may reasonably do
to promote and protect human rights.
The account has implications for collectives that should be considered
from the perspectives of both individual professionals and professional or-
ganizations. First, the obligation to assist the state is not limited to what the
professional may do by herself. The professional should also explore what
steps she might take in conjunction with others, either by working with
existing formal or informal collectives of professionals, or by seeking to
115. See supra Parts II, IlI, and IV.A.
116. See supra Parts II, III, and IV.A. Once again, just to be clear: if the answer to one
or more of the questions I posed were negative, it does not follow that the individual would
have no human rights obligations. Such obligations might arise under one or other alternative
theories. I discuss this point further below. See infra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
Winter 2012]
Michigan Journal of International Law
initiate such collectives. This may mean working outside as well as within
national borders. Professionals are ordinarily members (informally, if not
formally) of global communities of professionals. These global communi-
ties offer further opportunities and resources to promote human rights
compliance.
Second, the account has implications for existing collectives, in particu-
lar professional organizations. These organizations have collective status,
expertise, access, and resources well beyond those of any individual mem-
ber. So the obligation on the professional leadership of these organizations
is particularly weighty. There are, of course, a number of professional or-
ganizations devoted to the advancement of human rights-for example,
Physicians for Human Rights,' I Psychologists for Social Responsibility,'
18
and Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers' Committee for International
Human Rights). 19 However, the existence of these organizations does not
absolve other professional organizations with a broader remit, such as the
American Medical Association, from their own human rights obligations.
My account does not depend upon articulations of professional ethical
obligations related to human rights by professional associations.
Professional ethics codes are the children rather than the parents of the
human rights obligation I describe. 2 ' However, one important corollary of
my account is that professional associations have an obligation to adopt
measures-including issuing ethical codes and position statements-that
help professionals understand what their human rights obligations require of
them and facilitate the performance of those obligations. In some cases, this
work has already begun to happen. 121 However, in every case, there is more
work to be done.
22
117. About Us, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.physiciansforhuman
rights.org/about (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
118. Program on Human Rights and Psychology, PSYCHOLOGISTS FOR Soc. RESPONSI-
BILITY, http://www.psysr.org/about/programs/humanrights (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
119. About Us, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/about-us (last
visited Feb. 7, 2012).
120. I borrow this notion from Sen's discussion and comparison of the views of Jeremy
Bentham and H.L.A. Hart regarding the relationship between law and rights. Sen, supra note
81, at 326-27.
121. For a discussion of revisions to codes of medical ethics and position statements
adopted by medical professional associations, see Marks, supra note 11, at 723-24.
122. In my view, there is an obligation to investigate allegations of professional partici-
pation in human rights violations. In many developed nations (including the United States
and the United Kingdom), the task of licensing and disciplining professionals falls upon
licensing boards (in the United States, state licensing boards), and not professional associa-
tions. Such associations, however, ordinarily possess powers to expel members, and
expulsion from a professional association may have serious consequences. In some cases,
expulsion from a professional association may violate a condition of employment or jeopard-
ize professional licensure. Beyond this, I would argue that professional organizations have an
obligation to contribute to efforts to amend the regulatory frameworks so that they articulate
more clearly the human rights obligations of professionals and facilitate accountability in
extreme cases when they fall short. There are a few bills with this objective that are currently
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V. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROFESSIONAL ESSENTIALISM:
THE END OF SCHMOCTORS?
Robert Nozick posited some time ago that there could be schmoctors
whose profession is "just like doctoring except that its goal is to earn money
for the practitioner."'123 Arthur Applbaum has developed this idea more fully,
arguing that schmoctors might use the same expertise and skills as doctors
but conduct a "different practice with different ends and different role obli-
gations."'24 On this view, it might seem possible that there could be a host of
professionals-call them schmoctors, schmawyers, and (somewhat harder
on the eye and the mouth!) schmychologists' 25-who practice medicine,
law, and psychology without the human rights obligations I have articulated
here. I will argue briefly why this should not be the case.
If professionals wish to disavow human rights-related obligations, they
might seek to do so within an existing professional organization or try to
establish an alternative professional association. 126 Acts of disavowal could
potentially put professionals in breach of the human rights obligations I
have articulated. But let us leave this aside for the moment, and explore
what might follow. Although one could conduct a thought experiment in the
abstract, it may be helpful to begin the discussion with a real world exam-
ple: the recent struggle within the American Psychological Association
(APA) over the proper role of psychologists in counterterrorism interroga-
tions, and the ethical constraints that govern the activities of psychologists
occupying such a role.
The APA, in its 1986 resolution entitled "Opposition to Torture," re-
minded psychologists that they "are bound ... to respect the dignity and
worth of the individual and strive for the preservation and protection of fun-
damental human rights" and that, by its 1987 resolution entitled "Human
Rights," the organization "undertakes to commend the main UN human
rights instruments and documents to the attention of its boards, committees,
pending before state legislatures. See, e.g., Assemb. A6665C, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2009), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A06665&term=2009 (spon-
sored by Gottfried, Assemb.) (addressing the participation of health care professionals in
torture and improper treatment of prisoners).
123. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 234 n.* (1974).
124. ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES 50 (1999).
125. I refer here to these kinds of professionals collectively as professionals of the sch-
variety. I use the phrase for simplicity of expression; it is not intended to concede that such
persons would or should necessarily still be considered professionals.
126. An example of professionals challenging the policy of a major professional asso-
ciation is the Physicians' Working Group. It rejects the position adopted by the American
Medical Association on health care reform and advocates single-payer healthcare in the
United States-a position intended, of course, to promote the fulfillment of the right to
health. Thousands of practitioners and students have endorsed the Working Group's call.
Proposal of the Physicians' Working Group for Single-Payer National Health Insurance,
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and membership at large."'' 2' However, in July 2005, the association's Presi-
dential Task Force on Ethics and National Security (PENS Task Force)
concluded that psychologists' participation in coercive interrogations was
not constrained by reference to international law (in particular, human rights
law), but by "applicable" U.S. rules and regulations as "developed and re-
fined" since September 11, 2001.128 The Task Force Report stated that
members "did not reach consensus on ... [t]he role of human rights stand-
ards in an ethics code."'129 This failure to embrace human rights triggered a
grassroots revolt in the APA. The resulting struggle led the association to
pass four successive resolutions over a two-year period (in August 2006,
August 2007, February 2008, and September 2008)130 intended to tighten up
the APA's position on the participation of psychologists in interrogation-
the last of these being the successful ballot resolution mentioned above.'31
A number of outcomes in this ongoing struggle are possible. Many
members have left the APA and some have joined Psychologists for Social
Responsibility (PSR). 3 2 If a mass defection were to occur so that more psy-
chologists were members of PSR than of the APA, the significance of the
APA might diminish and the professional codes of PSR might be considered
better evidence than those of the APA regarding prevailing ethical standards
of the profession. But might a more drastic outcome be possible? Could
there be a more substantial bifurcation, in which higher ethical standards
(incorporating the human rights obligations I advance here) exist for some
psychologists but not for others, who might be called schmychologists to
distinguish them from their colleagues?
This question raises the specter of renegotiating the social contract be-
tween the state and psychologists wishing to become schmychologists.
Although my account does not categorically exclude this possibility, there
127. Council Policy Manual: Chapter XIV International Affairs, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
AsS'N, http://www.apa.org/about/govemance/council/policy/chapter-14.aspx (last visited
Feb. 7, 2012).
128. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIA-
TION PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 5
(2005) [hereinafter PENS REPORT], available at http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/
pens.pdf. See also Tara McKelvey, First Do Some Harm, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 14, 2005,
http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=first-do someharm (critiquing the task force, many of
whose members had military or national security affiliations); Mark Benjamin, Psychological
Warfare, SALON.COM (July 26, 2006), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/07/26/
interrogation/index.html.
129. PENS REPORT, supra note 128, at 9.
130. See Press Release, Am. Psychological Ass'n, Summary of APA Policy on Psy-
chologists' Involvement in National Security Interrogations (July 1, 2008), http://
www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2008/07/interrogations.aspx.
131. 2008 APA Petition Resolution Ballot, supra note 105.
132. PSYCHOLOGISTS FOR Soc. RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.psysr.org/ (last visited Feb.
7, 2012). On the departure of psychologists from the APA, see, for example, Stephen Soldz,
Noted Psychologist Beth Shinn Resigns from American Psychological Association, PSYCHE,
SCi. & Soc'Y (Oct. 7, 2007), http://psychoanalystsopposewar.org/blog/2007/10/07/ noted-
psychologist-beth-shinn-resigns-from-american-psychological-association/.
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are several reasons why it would be very unlikely and highly problematic
for both the state and the professionals concerned. From the professionals'
point of view, the rejection of human fights norms clearly imperils public
trust in the profession and the social status of its professionals. This was
why there was such a vocal grassroots response to the APA PENS Task
Force's rejection of human fights norms in 2005133 and-in part-why we
have not seen similar efforts to reject human fights norms in other profes-
sions. Moreover, such a rejection might also jeopardize the objectors'
entitlement to some or all of the privileges and protections necessary for
their professional practice, and it might even call into question the status of
our putative schmychologists as professionals.
From the state's perspective, the act of creating a cadre of professionals
liberated from human rights obligations would potentially put the state in
serious violation of its human rights obligations and threaten its legitimacy.
It would certainly be a violation of the state's obligation to respect and pro-
tect human rights, if it were to endorse a cadre of schmychologists who
were given the green light to violate the state's perfect obligations not to
interfere with the rights of others (for example, by torturing them or expos-
ing them to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment). More broadly, the
creation of alternative cadres of professionals of the sch-variety would cor-
rode the privileges and protections of their human rights-obligated
professional cousins by, among other things, undermining their monopoly
of practice. Worse still, one of the lessons of totalitarianism is that the crea-
tion of alternative professional structures (most notably, Nazi professional
associations that sapped preexisting associations of both members and pow-
er) can lead in extreme cases to widespread abuse in which professionals are
co-opted into systematic human rights violations.
134
Given the threat to the legitimacy of the state (both real and perceived),
this renegotiation would also be undesirable for the state. It is notable that
U.S. federal law and Defense Department regulations ordinarily require mil-
itary health professionals to be licensed by state boards.135 The Department
133. For a discussion of the constellation of factors that led to the APA PENS Task
Force Report of 2005, and the grassroots response, see Stephen Soldz, Closing Eyes to Atroc-
ities: U.S. Psychologists, Detainee Interrogations and the Response of the American
Psychological Association, in INTERROGATIONS, FORCED FEEDINGS, AND THE ROLE OF
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 103 (Ryan Goodman & Mindy Jane Roseman eds., 2009).
134. See PAUL WEINDLING, HEALTH, RACE, AND GERMAN POLITICS BETWEEN NATION-
AL UNIFICATION AND NAZISM 1870-1945, at 520 (1993) (discussing the establishment and
operation of the Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Arztebund, the Nazi Doctors League, as
part of a Nazi strategy; similar processes were also evident in law, engineering, and architec-
ture); see also ROBERT N. PROCTOR, RACIAL HYGIENE: MEDICINE UNDER THE NAZIS 64-66,
69-70 (1988) (discussing the role of doctors in the Nazi quest for racial purity).
135. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1094 (2006) ("A person under the jurisdiction of the Secre-
tary of a military department may not provide health care independently as a health-care
professional under this chapter unless the person has a current license to provide such
care."); Dep't of Def. Directive 6025.13, Clinical Quality Management Program (CQMP) in
the Military Health Services System (MHSS) § 5.2.2.2 (2004) ("Healthcare practitioners
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needs health professionals who continue to satisfy standards for civilian
clinical practice. It should not, and apparently does not, want to become a
refuge for practitioners with lower standards in either clinical skills or
ethical norms. In essence, the laws and regulations proclaim: Health pro-
fessionals wanted; schmoctors and schmychologists need not apply!136
This discussion should raise serious doubts about whether there is any
room for professionals of the sch-variety in a state concerned with preserv-
ing its legitimacy. But whatever view one takes about that question, the state
needs-and must therefore provide the requisite privileges and protections
for-professionals of the ordinary kind (doctors, lawyers, psychologists,
and journalists among others) who are both able and willing to assist the
state in the performance of its human rights obligations. 37
VI. THE PROFESSIONAL AS ROOTED COSMOPOLITAN
A. The Professional and the State
It should be apparent that there are two principal beneficiaries--or,
more accurately, two categories of beneficiary-of the professional's obliga-
tion to assist the state with the performance of its human rights obligations:
the state and the individual whose rights would otherwise be violated. For
students of contract law, the notion of multiple beneficiaries of a contractual
obligation is, of course, not novel; nor is the idea that some beneficiaries
(often called third parties or third party beneficiaries) are not parties to the
contract. However, tying professionals' human rights obligations to the state
might raise concerns, since the obligation may often require professionals to
protect individuals from the state. I will explain briefly why this is less
problematic than it appears and why it also demonstrates a material ad-
vantage for my account.
First, the basic concern similarly applies to the norms of international
human rights law. States are the architects of the international legal order,
and of the treaties that establish the structure and core content of human
shall have and maintain a current, valid, and unrestricted license.., before practicing within
the defined scope of practice for like specialties.").
136. The U.S. Army's continued efforts to train a small number of physicians to serve
as behavioral science consultants to interrogation teams, contrary to the positions of the
American Medical Association and American Psychiatric Association, see supra note 104,
might be viewed, at first glance, as schmoctor-ish. But if interrogators had to choose between
a doctor and a schmoctor to monitor interrogations, they might well prefer the former so that
they could invoke the higher ethical standards of doctors as an imprimatur of decency for
their practices. See Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors of Interrogation, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 17, 17-22.
137. Those who accept the main argument advanced here but advocate a role for the
sch-variety of professionals would presumably require that the state take measures (for ex-
ample, conferring enhanced privileges or protections) to ensure that there was a sufficient
body of professionals of the ordinary kind who were willing (explicitly or tacitly) and able to
ensure that it can meet its human rights obligations.
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rights law. States are also the principal addressees of these treaties. They are
the primary guarantors of human rights within their borders, and yet they
are also the most likely violators of human rights. This is the nature of the
global human rights regime. 138 Second, the very purpose of the account of-
fered here is to establish cohorts of individuals-both within and outside the
organs of the state-who have clear human rights responsibilities and act
accordingly.
Third, the account allows for a reframing of many cases of the so-called
dual loyalties problem. 139 Military medical professionals are often presented
with competing obligations arising from the social and therapeutic purposes
of medicine or, viewed more narrowly, with military and medical
obligations that appear to conflict. Although the human rights obligations of
professionals may not resolve all these tensions, in many cases they will
help align perceived competing loyalties, and in some cases they may even
eliminate the tension entirely. In a detention environment, for example, pro-
fessionals may feel compelled to choose between their state and a detainee.
Since the former has provided them with a career and an identity in which
loyalty and service are paramount, and the latter is clearly an object of sus-
picion (if not worse), it should not be surprising that this conflict is
frequently resolved in favor of the state. The account I advance here makes
clear that whatever the instructions of her superiors or the current office-
holders of the state, there is a more fundamental obligation owed by the
professional to the state, one that also operates to protect the detainee. When
a professional is asked to facilitate the torture of a detainee, or to participate
in cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, loyalty to both the state and the
detainee requires her to refuse. 14 ° Admittedly, this is not the way loyalty to
138. There are, of course, supranational bodies charged with monitoring human rights
compliance and a court, the International Criminal Court (ICC), charged with prosecuting the
most serious human rights violations in the event that states fail to act. For a review of U.N.
human rights bodies, see JULIE A. MERTUS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
GUIDE FOR A NEW ERA (2009). These bodies have been created by the collective acts of
states and are often subject to charges that their agendas are shaped by the goals of powerful
individual state actors-a charge that is sometimes warranted and sometimes not. See, e.g.,
Muhittin Ataman, The Impact of Non-State Actors on World Politics: A Challenge to Nation-
States, 2 ALTERNATIVES 42, 44 (2003) ("The IMF and the UN Security Council are two
prominent organizations in which some powerful states direct activities of the organization
and impose their principles selectively.").
139. See, e.g., INT'L DUAL LOYALTY WORKING GRP., DUAL LOYALTY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN HEALTH PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 11 (2002), available at https://
s3.amazonaws.com/PHRReports/dualloyalties-2002-report.pdf (defining the problem of
dual loyalties as the "simultaneous obligations [of a health professional], express or implied,
to a patient and to a third party, often the state"). See generally M.G. BLOCHE, THE HIPPO-
CRATIC MYTH: WHY DOCTORS ARE UNDER PRESSURE TO RATION CARE, PRACTICE POLITICS,
AND COMPROMISE THEIR PROMISE TO HEAL (2011) (discussing various social purposes of
medicine that are at odds with the doctor's Hippocratic commitment to patients).
140. The question of dual loyalties is discussed more fully in Jonathan H. Marks, Dual
Disloyalties: Law and Medical Ethics at Guantanamo Bay, in PHYSICIANS AT WAR: THE
DUAL LOYALTIES CHALLENGE 53, 65-66 (F. Allhoff ed., 2008) (arguing that health
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the state is most commonly perceived. But the state is in this vital respect a
beneficiary of the professional obligation I have articulated-even when
(and, I would argue, especially when) it leads the professional to challenge
or confront her superiors, including policy makers.
One important benefit for the state is the preservation of its legitimacy.
But it is not the only benefit. As behavioral law and economics reminds us,
in extremis (for example, in the wake of a terror attack, national security
crisis, or public health emergency) there will be a strong temptation to vio-
late human rights, especially those of non-nationals, minorities, and anyone
perceived as "other."'14I These violations will often be the result of symbolic
measures that do not address the threat to national security or public health,
but provide instead some form of reassurance to the public. 142 This reassur-
ance is even more problematic when it mutes calls for more effective
measures that would actually address the threat. In such cases, the state's
international human rights commitments (irrespective of the reason they
were made) 143 can and should serve as a kind of "Ulysses contract," tying
the hands of the state when it might otherwise be tempted to leap into peri-
lous waters. One might think of professionals as akin to Ulysses's sailors.
They could not be tied to the mast like their master, because they had to
man the ship. But their ears were plugged so they could not hear the sirens
sing. In times of crisis, professionals may also have to plug their ears if they
are to resist the seductive power of the national security siren song.
At the risk of doing irredeemable violence to the metaphor, sometimes
the vessel is a pirate ship with a rogue at the helm. My account is neither an
exhaustive nor an exclusive source of the human rights obligations of pro-
fessionals. It has the most to offer in the case of liberal democracies where
the institutions of government and the professions are not wholly dysfunc-
tional, and the relationship of mutual dependence and reciprocal legitimacy
that I have described generally holds. In repressive regimes, there may well
be other accounts of the human rights obligations of individuals (both pro-
fessionals and nonprofessionals) that have more to offer. 44 And even in
professionals who rely on their duty to justify their human rights violations exemplify dual
disloyalty).
141. See Marks, supra note 94, at 562-63.
142. Id. at 588.
143. See Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 52
J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 588 (2007) (presenting and analyzing empirical research on the rela-
tionship between states' human rights commitments and their human rights compliance).
144. Some accounts may be derived from general human rights theories that apply to
all individuals, whether or not they are professionals. See, e.g., Sen, supra note 81. Other
sources may be specific to particular professions, whether derived from social contracts be-
tween a category of professionals and their communities or incorporated into theories of
professionalism that apply to a particular category of professionals. I do not propose to artic-
ulate here a theory of civil disobedience for professionals. However, for a discussion of the
duties of lawyers operating in unjust regimes, see Alexandra D. Lahav, Portraits of Re-
sistance: How Lawyers Respond to Unjust Proceedings, 57 UCLA L. REv. 725 (2010).
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liberal democracies, there may be additional sources of professionals' hu-
man rights obligations.'45
B. The Global Professional
Human rights obligations are, of course, by their nature owed to all hu-
manity. In that sense, human rights are clearly cosmopolitan. 146 But that
cosmopolitanism is rooted in an essential way by global human rights law
and practice. 47 A state's primary human rights obligations are limited to
those members of humanity who are within the state's own jurisdiction
and control-in most cases, those within a state's own borders.148 Where
states exercise jurisdiction and control, they have obligations in relation to
noncitizens too-as the British government learned in its unsuccessful
efforts to defend legislation permitting the indefinite detention of suspected
145. For example, the United States is not among the 160 states that have ratified the
ICESCR, supra note 21, Article 12 of which has been authoritatively interpreted to require
states to work toward the realization of health care that is geographically and economically
accessible for all. See CESCR, General Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest Attaina-
ble Standard of Health, $ 36, U.N. Doc. No. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000). For this reason,
another theory might provide a better account of U.S. health professionals' obligations relat-
ed to this right. See, e.g., Russell L. Gruen, Steven D. Pearson, & Troyen A. Brennan,
Physician-Citizens-Public Roles and Professional Obligations, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 94,
96-98 (2004) (invoking a social contract approach to argue that health professionals have an
ethical obligation to assume "public roles," including participation in political debate and
advocacy, that promote access to health care and address socioeconomic factors that directly
affect health such as poor housing conditions that cause disease).
146. A detailed discussion of cosmopolitanism is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
taxonomical review, see Pauline Kleingeld & Eric Brown, Cosmopolitanism, in THE STAN-
FORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 65, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/cosmopolitanism (last updated Nov. 28, 2006).
147. The use of the word "rooted" is not intended as a formal invocation or endorse-
ment of the conception of "rooted cosmopolitanism" advanced by Kwame Anthony Appiah.
See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 212-72 (2004); cf. KWAME AN-
THONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS, at xvii (2006)
(discussing "partial cosmopolitanism").
148. States engaged in the occupation of other territories do, however, have obligations
in relation to the inhabitants of those territories under both human rights law and internation-
al humanitarian law. See CARMEN TIBURCIo, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (2001). But see Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII
Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 (holding inadmissible a claim brought by six citizens of the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia against seventeen European countries that were members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) arising from a NATO bombing mission that struck a
radio and television station in Belgrade in 1999). For a stinging critique of the Bankovic
case, see Erik Roxstrom, The NATO Bombing Case (Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.) and the
Limits of Western Human Rights Protection, 23 B.U. INT'L L.J. 55, 62 (2005) (arguing that
the decision "evinces a vision of human rights that, ultimately, is inimical to the very purpose
of human rights"). In Al-Skeini & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 589, 647-51 in 131-42 (2011), the European Court reaffirmed the exceptional
nature of extraterritoriality but found for the applicants, and in doing so outlined three excep-
tional categories: "state agent authority and control," "effective control over an area," and
"the Convention legal space 'espacejuridique.' "
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international terrorists provided they were not British citizens.'49 Under in-
ternational human rights law and the associated practice, states' obligations
in relation to the human rights of those situated outside the territories they
control' 150 are, for the greater part, secondary. Their obligations kick in when
the host state is unwilling or unable to meet its human rights obligations,
and even then those secondary obligations are mediated in prevailing ac-
counts by the demand that action, especially coercive intervention, should
ordinarily be taken through the institutions of the United Nations. 5'
The human rights-oriented account of professional ethical obligations
offered here is rooted in similar ways. First, since the obligations are tied
directly to international human rights law, they similarly reflect and embody
the distinction between primary and secondary responsibilities that I have
just described.'52 Second, the account of the professional human rights obli-
gation is derived from the notion of a social contract with the state, so it is
rooted in the duty and loyalty to the state that I describe above. Third, as I
have shown, the discharge of that duty clearly operates to the benefit of the
state.
The globalization of the professions has the potential to increase the tug
of cosmopolitanism. Professionals are increasingly members of global pro-
fessional communities, engaging with colleagues, clients, and funders
outside their national borders. This is no threat to the theory proposed here,
since the ability to operate globally in this manner is still dependent in part
upon the privileges and protections conferred by the professional's home
state. On the contrary, the global reach of professionals may speak to the
substance of the obligation I have articulated, since international profession-
al relations and collaborations may enhance the opportunities and avenues
for professionals to secure greater human rights compliance at home.
Some professional associations have begun to incorporate cosmopoli-
tanism into their notions of professionalism. Most dramatically, the
American Medical Association's Declaration of Professional Responsibility
is subtitled Medicine's Social Contract with Humanity, and its preamble
149. This legislative provision was deemed incompatible with the United Kingdom's
human rights obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. See A v. Sec'y
of State for the Home Dep't, [20041 UKHL 56.
150. See supra notes 40 and 148 and accompanying text.
151. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 35, at 31, 49. See also supra notes
35-37 and accompanying text.
152. Although obligations will therefore be more onerous in relation to human rights
violations within their own states, professionals may still have obligations arising from hu-
man rights violations in other states-for example, to exhort their own government to pursue
action through the United Nations in order to stop the violations. But again, the theory I offer
here does not exhaust the potential source of the latter obligations. For example, there may
be reciprocal obligations on the part of national communities of professionals to assist each
other with the performance of the duty articulated here. Such arguments become all the more
compelling with the increasing globalization of the professions.
[Vol. 33:215
Professional Ethics and Human Rights
contains this simple lofty sentence: "Humanity is our patient."'53 The de-
claratory section begins: "We, the members of the world community of
physicians, solemnly commit ourselves . "..."154 This text appears to have
cosmopolitan debts and aspirations, although I leave for now the question of
whether the substance of the declared commitments lives up to those aspira-
tions. But, at the very least, physicians from other nations might reasonably
expect, given the language of this document, that their U.S. counterparts
will respond when they reach out to them in pursuance of the human rights
obligations I advance here.
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS:
TRANSLATIONAL REWARDS
There are two distinct rewards that this move toward a unified theory of
professional ethics and human rights might offer. The first results from the
act of translating the responsibilities of the state into responsibilities of indi-
viduals, and more particularly, professionals. The second reward results
from the manner in which the theory translates human rights obligations in
the legal sense back into human rights obligations in the moral sense, in
particular, as professional ethical obligations.
In her critique of "rights talk," which she clarifies to mean "our Ameri-
can rights dialect," Mary Ann Glendon lays several charges, among them
"its near-aphasia concerning responsibility."' 155 As Michael Perry has rightly
observed, Glendon's charge was not directed at international human rights
law, but instead at the manner in which rights are discussed in contemporary
American political discourse. 5 6 Nonetheless, Perry poses the question in rela-
tion to international human rights discourse, and finds the charge wanting.
157
153. AM. MED. ASS'N, DECLARATION OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: MEDICINE'S
SOCIAL CONTRACT WITH HUMANITY pmbl. (2001), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
resources/doclethicsldecofprofessional.pdf. Although the document does not refer expressly
to human rights, its invocation of "dignity" is consonant with the use of the same word in the
International Bill of Rights. Perhaps unsurprisingly, none of these documents defines the
word.
154. Id. The American Medical Association's declaration also addresses serious human
rights violations, in particular, crimes against humanity. It includes commitments to
"[riespect ... human life and the dignity of every individual;" "[r]efrain from crimes against
humanity and condemn all such acts;" "[t]reat the sick and injured with competence and
compassion and without prejudice;" and "[a]pply our knowledge and skills when needed,
though doing so may put us at risk." Id. princ. I-IV. These obligations are expressly not role
dependent. On the contrary, they are intended to "transcend physician roles and specialties,
professional associations, geographic boundaries, and political divides." Medical Ethics:
Declaration of Professional Responsibility, AM. MED. Ass'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/physician-resources/medicaI-ethics/declarati on-professiona -responsibility.page
(last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
155. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIs-
COURSE 14 (1991).
156. MICHAEL PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 49-50 (1998).
157. Id. at 50-54.
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He points to several international human rights treaties that mention respon-
sibilities in relation to human rights-not least, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which acknowledges in the preamble that "the
individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which
he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and ob-
servance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant."'158 1 would add to
Perry's list two notable documents applying specifically to health profes-
sionals and lawyers respectively: the U.N. Principles of Medical Ethics
159
and the U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers. 160 In general, howev-
er, international human rights law is not at its most articulate when it comes
to addressing what any one individual owes another in relation to human
rights. The account proposed here helps fill that gap by offering a nuanced
articulation of the human rights obligations of categories of individuals who
possess social status, access, and expertise, and whose human rights respon-
sibilities are essential to the legitimacy of states as well as to the
international human rights project.
The second reward relates to what Richard Rorty called "human rights
foundationalism"161-that is, the quest for the moral foundations of human
rights. This quest may take a number of forms. The most challenging is the
quest for a unified secular justification for human rights as a set of moral
claims or some principle (or set of principles) thought to undergird those
claims. Avowedly optimistic and pessimistic examples of this kind of en-
158. ICCPR, supra note 21, pmbl.
159. G.A. Res. 37/194, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/194 (Dec. 18, 1982). These principles,
adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, provide (among
other things) that it is a
contravention of medical ethics for health personnel, particularly physicians[, to]
apply their knowledge and skills in order to assist in the interrogation of prisoners
and detainees in a manner that may adversely affect the physical or mental health
or condition of such prisoners or detainees and which is not in accordance with the
relevant international instruments [including the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights].
Id. princ. 3. See also Marks, supra note 11, at 724 (discussing the connection between ethi-
cal constraints on health professionals and international legal prohibitions and human rights
protections).
160. Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers,
U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.I, at 117 (1990). These principles articulate the obliga-
tions of governments, lawyers, and professional associations of lawyers. Principle 14
provides that "[1]awyers, in protecting the rights of their clients and promoting the cause of
justice, shall seek to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by national
and international law." Id. at 121.
161. Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES, supra note 38, at 111, 116. This project is char-
acterized by Rorty as futile and "outmoded"-a charge that Perry disputes in THE IDEA OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 156, at 37-43.
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deavor are to be found in the works of Amartya Sen
162 and Michael Perry 163
respectively. I share the sentiment of both Sen and Perry that there is value
in this work, but I am grateful that the drafters of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights-who held a wide variety of religious and secular philo-
sophical views--did not await its completion before putting pen to paper.
The result may be an incompletely theorized agreement, but it has provided
a sufficiently firm foundation on which international human rights law and
practice has been built. This brings us to a different kind of foundational-
ism-one that explores the philosophical foundations of human rights as
legal claims, either individually or collectively. 64 This may be a more man-
ageable exercise, particularly if one acknowledges (as Michael Perry does)
that there may be sound practical reasons for embodying certain claims as
legal rights-even absolute rights-in the absence of a philosophical foun-
dation for similar status as moral rights. 65 Although this exercise is also of
162. See, e.g., Sen, supra note 81, at 319 (building on his earlier work on capabilities,
Sen argues that certain freedoms qualify as human rights because they satisfy the " 'thresh-
old conditions' of (i) special importance and (ii) social influenceability").
163. See generally PERRY, supra note 156, at 11-41 (explaining his struggle to find a
"non-religious" ground for the morality of human rights); see also PERRY, supra note 87, at
14-29 (discussing his failure to find a satisfactory answer in the work of, among others,
Ronald Dworkin and Martha Nussbaum, or in claims based on evolutionary biology). Perry's
efforts are directed at finding a secular justification for the claim that every human being has
inherent dignity and is inviolable. See PERRY, supra note 156, at 6. In my view, he rightly
concedes:
We must be careful not to confuse the question of the ground of morality of human
rights ... with the different question of the ground or grounds of one or another
human-rights-claims. Even if there is no non-religious ground or grounds for the
morality of human rights, there are no doubt secular reasons-indeed, self-
regarding reasons-for wanting the law, including the international law, to protect
some human-rights-claims.
Id. at 25.
164. On this point, I have some sympathy for the view expressed by BEITZ, supra note
19, at 128. He argues:
[H]uman rights need not be interpreted as deriving authority from a single, more
basic value or interest such as those of human dignity, personhood or membership.
The reasons we have to care about them vary with the content of the right in ques-
tion .... Human rights protect a plurality of interests . . .. These rights have a
distinct identity as normative standards, but this identity is not to be found in their
grounds or in the nature of their requirements for action. We find it, instead, in
their special role as norms of global political life.
Id.
165. Michael Perry acknowledges that even if there are, in his view, no moral absolutes
(preventing, for example, killing an innocent to save a nation), "it makes very good sense, as
a practical matter, that international law establishes some moral rights as unconditional
(nonderogable) rights." PERRY, supra note 156, at 106. In the case of "imaginable-but-
extremely-unlikely conditions" ("so unlikely as to be negligible") where failure to violate a
legal right would cause "the heavens [to] fall," he acknowledges there may still be good
reason to insist on an unconditional legal right if conditioning that right would create an
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some value, human rights as legal norms do not depend on its completion.
Human rights are now, as Rorty observed, "a fact of the world,"'16 6 and part
of the core fabric of the international legal order. As parties to networks of
international treaties, states have assumed a variety of legal obligations re-
lating to human rights. Those obligations are binding irrespective of the
rationale for their adoption or the philosophical or religious claims that may
have motivated those who drafted or endorsed them and, for that matter,
irrespective of patchwork enforcement.1
67
When the focus shifts from the legal human rights obligations of states
to the ethical obligations of individuals in relation to human rights, the
foundationalist concern in the first sense articulated in the preceding para-
graph is reawakened. The theory advanced here avoids this problem by
providing a mechanism to link the human rights obligations of professionals
directly to the body of international legal norms. In my account, the force of
the human rights obligations of professionals is derived from the interna-
tional legal order-mediated only by the social contract by virtue of which
professionals operate. These obligations may derive additional support from
human rights as ethical claims, but they are not dependent on human rights
as ethical claims.
VIII. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACCOUNT
A. Human Rights Education and Mentorship
If human rights occupy (and are to be recognized as occupying) a cen-
tral role in the ethical commitments of professionals as I contend in this
Article, this will have important implications for the education of profes-
sionals (both qualifying and continuing education), and for formal and
informal systems of mentorship. The changes that will be required will vary
from profession to profession. If we examine medicine, it is readily apparent
that much work needs to be done. More than a decade ago, the World Medi-
"escape clause" for political authorities, leading to many more violations of underlying mor-
al rights by states. When the authorities are, in extremis, "desperately struggling to keep the
heavens in place," he doubts they would worry about the international legal sanction. Id. at
105-06.
166. Rorty, supra note 161, at 134.
167. Whether and to what extent states could formally revoke some of these interna-
tional commitments is beyond the scope of this Article. Notably, however, states tend not to
attempt this. For example, when the Bush administration was approving the use of so-called
"enhanced" interrogation techniques, the President was-at the same time-affirming the
nation's commitment to the prohibition on torture. See, e.g., Bush: 'We Do Not Torture' Ter-
ror Suspects, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 7, 2005, 4:09 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.comid/
9956644/ns/us-news-security/t/bush-we-do-not-torture-terror-suspects/. As I have argued
elsewhere, the administration was instead endeavoring to define torture out of existence. See
Marks, supra note 94. One reason for this approach, of course, is the political fallout from
revocation of these norms and the impact on the state's own perceived legitimacy and on its
relations with other states.
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cal Association (WMA) passed a resolution declaring that human rights
"form an integral part of the work and culture of the medical profession,"
and "strongly recommend[ing] to Medical Schools world-wide that the
teaching of Medical Ethics and Human Rights be included as an obligatory
course in their curricula.' ' 68 However, in a recent study of schools of medi-
cine and public health in the United States, less than a third of medical
schools reported offering any curriculum related to health and human
rights. 69 While most U.S. medical schools are not providing much, if any,
human rights education, a recent study of medical students from forty-six
countries suggests that tomorrow's doctors recognize the importance of hu-
man rights (at least while they are still in medical school). 7 ' More than
eighty-five percent of respondents demanded training in human rights, and
more than half believed it should be compulsory.'7 ' Almost eighty-five per-
cent believed that each of the following was a "very important task" for
physicians: (a) actively preventing professional practices that violate basic
human rights in the health system, and (b) developing and promoting atti-
tudes respectful of human rights in care practices. 7 2 Some countries are
ahead of others in addressing the WMA's call for the inclusion of human
rights education in medical training-most notably South Africa, where the
complicity of physicians in prisoner abuse during apartheid has focused atten-
tion on this issue.' 73 The reports of the complicity of health professionals in
168. Resolution on the Inclusion of Medical Ethics and Human Rights in the Curricu-
lum of Medical Schools World-Wide, WORLD MED. ASS'N (Oct. 1999), http://
www.wma.net/en/30publications/l Opolicies/e8/index.html.
169. L. Emily Cotter et al., Health and Human Rights Education in U.S. Schools of
Medicine and Public Health: Current Status and Future Challenges, PLoS ONE, Mar. 18,
2009, at 3-4, http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2Fl0.1371%2Fjournal.pone
.0004916. In most of the institutions where the curriculum was offered, health and human
rights was just a module of a required or elective course, or part of an elective conference or
symposium. Id. at 3. In addition, the survey's authors expressed concern that respondents
may have over-reported their institution's human rights offerings. They also suggest that
"social desirability" might explain why, despite the limited offerings, more than seventy
percent of medical school deans said it was "important" or "very important" for physicians
to understand human rights. Id.
170. E. Kabengele Mpinga et al., Faut-il former les itudiants en mdecine aux droits de
I'homme? L'opinion d'itudiants en midecine de quarante-six pays [Should Medical Schools
Train Students in Human Rights? The Opinions of Medical Students in Forty-Six Countries],




173. See, e.g., Derrick Silove, Doctors and the State: Lessons from the Biko Case, 30
Soc. ScI. MED. 417, 422-24 (1990) (discussing the complicity of physicians in the death of
Steve Biko); see also Editorial, Developing Human Rights Competencies for South African
Health Professional Graduates, 97 S. AFR. MED. J. 1269, 1269-70 (2007) (discussing recent
proposals to integrate human rights education into the medical curriculum in South Africa).
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detainee abuse in the war on terror may, in time, have a similar effect on
medical education in the United States.
174
Medicine is not the only paradigm profession where more and better
human rights training is required. Many lawyers across the globe still pass
through law school without obtaining any education in human rights law.
The exceptions are those who train in countries that have incorporated hu-
man rights norms into their domestic law-for example, law students in
Britain, where the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the European Con-
vention on Human Rights into domestic law'T7 -or those fortunate enough
to attend one of the few U.S. law schools that have a compulsory interna-
tional and comparative law component in their curriculum.'76 Lawyers are
important not simply because they have the human rights obligations I ad-
vance in this Article, but also because they can train the trainers in other
professions, building an ever-expanding cadre of human rights-literate pro-
fessionals. This cadre will be vital to the acculturation of human rights in
the professions. As recent empirical work on ethics education in the bio-
medical sphere has demonstrated, formal education alone is not sufficient.'77
Mentorship is vital for the acculturation of norms, and it must be the right
kind of mentorship, because subtle cues about the lack of importance of
human rights can undermine the effect of any formal curriculum.
I do not expect non-legal professionals to acquire a comprehensive
knowledge of international human rights jurisprudence to rival that of the
staff lawyers at Human Rights Watch. Nor do I expect them to anticipate or
second guess complex assessments of when interference with qualified hu-
man rights may be justifiable. However, their human rights education should
equip them in at least three ways. First, they should have a basic but solid
grounding in human rights law. They should be familiar with core human
rights treaties, understand the kinds of interests that human rights law pro-
tects, and appreciate the nature of states' associated obligations. They
should know, for example, that human rights law does not just prohibit tor-
ture. It prohibits conduct falling short of torture that constitutes cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment. 178 Professionals should also know that
there is a positive obligation to treat detainees humanely.'79 They should be
familiar with other basic principles of human rights law: for example, they
174. Although I have singled out physicians in this paragraph, human rights education
for nurses is, of course, also important. For an empirical study of human rights education in
nurses' training in the United Kingdom, see Mark Chamberlain, Human Rights Education for
Nursing Students, 8 NURSING ETHIcs 211 (2001).
175. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).
176. See Davis, supra note 108, 174-75 n.108; see also Jonathan H. Marks, Britain Is
No Longer an Island-International Law Matters Too, TIMES (U.K.), May 18, 2004, at 13.
177. See Melissa S. Anderson et al., What Do Mentoring and Training in the Responsi-
ble Conduct of Research Have to Do with Scientists'Misbehavior? Findings from a National
Survey of NIH-Funded Scientists, 82 ACAD. MED. 853, 856 (2007).
178. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 7.
179. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art. 3(1).
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should know that neither derogation from the provisions of the ICCPR nor
interference with qualified human rights can be justified if it is conducted in
a manner that violates the prohibition on discrimination. 8 ° Second, their
human rights education should make professionals aware of, and prepare
them for, the ways in which the exercise of their professional skills may
raise human rights issues or create the potential for human rights violations.
Third, they should receive training in how they can use their professional
expertise, access to resources, and social status to protect and promote hu-
man rights.' 8' This kind of training should help ensure that professionals are
better equipped to satisfy the professional ethical obligation I have advanced
in this Article.
B. Human Rights Practice as Professional Practice
Arguments for increased human rights or ethics training in professional
curricula are often met with concerns about finding a place for new modules
in a tightly packed curriculum. 8' These arguments commonly prevail in
medical schools, although a place for neuroscience or another developing
field is more easily found.'83 In my view, this results from a failure to per-
ceive ethics and human rights as integral to professional practice. In the case
of practice-oriented professions such as law and medicine, it is important to
emphasize human rights as a practice rather than as an abstract theory, a
body of often-unenforced international law, or a set of lofty aspirations. Alt-
hough the language of human rights practice is usually applied to state
actors, it is only by exploring the synergies between human rights practice
and professional practice-and by talking about human rights practice qua
professional practice-that professions can develop and sustain a member-
ship that is capable of performing the kinds of human rights obligations
argued for in this Article. Of course, talk is not enough. The recognition of
human rights practice as an intrinsic part of professional practice should
lead to the creation of institutional structures designed to facilitate and pro-
mote this practice.'84
180. ICCPR, supra note 21, arts. 2(1), 4(1); see also Siracusa Principles, supra note 22,
[ 28, 36.
181. In this context, it is worth noting (and professionals should be taught to recognize)
how professional expertise may also contribute to our understanding of human rights norms
and what they require. See, e.g., Metan Ba~oglu et al., Torture Versus Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment: Is the Distinction Real or Apparent?, 64 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSY-
CHIATRY 277, 284 (2007) (arguing that psychological manipulations, humiliating treatment,
and forced stress positions do not seem to be substantially different from physical torture in
terms of the severity of mental suffering they cause, the underlying mechanism of traumatic
stress, and their long-term psychological sequelae).
182. See Cotter et al., supra note 169, at 1, 3-4.
183. See id. at 3 ("[T]he most frequently reported barrier to implementation of [health
and human rights] courses was competition for time in students' schedules.").
184. For a discussion of some of these structures in relation to health professionals
(including whistleblower protections), see Jonathan H. Marks, Looking Back, Thinking
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C. Bridging the Gap Between Human Rights
Commitments and Compliance
Assessing the impact of human rights norms on behavior-whether the
actor of interest is an individual, an institution, or a state-is not an easy
task. 85 Although some qualitative work (in particular, the examination of
case studies) has provided cause for optimism, 86 recent quantitative re-
search has attracted much attention, because it suggests that ratification of
human rights treaties does not lead to greater human rights compliance. 87
To students of international relations and behavioral psychology, these dis-
appointing results should not have been surprising. There is no reason why
the act of signing or ratifying a treaty should necessarily trigger an accul-
turation of the norms it contains.
As one might expect, the effect of ratification appears to depend upon a
variety of factors, among them how democratic a country is.' 88 However,
even in democracies, other factors come into play. During 2003-2004, the
walls of Abu Ghraib prison (in particular, the Joint Interrogation and De-
briefing Center) were plastered with posters entitled "Interrogation Rules of
Engagement,"' 8 9 purporting to remind U.S. interrogators and military police
that the "Geneva Conventions apply," that interrogations must be "humane
and lawful" and that "[d]etainees will NEVER be touched in a malicious
and unwanted manner." Given the number of documents and images depict-
ing the abuse at Abu Ghraib that have been made public in the last eight
years, it is clear these posters were far from effective. This should hardly be
surprising given the host of factors-discussed elsewhere 90 -- that can con-
tribute to or undermine human rights compliance, above and beyond the
state's formal legal commitments.
Ahead: The Complicity of Health Professionals in Detainee Abuse, in INTERROGATIONS,
FORCED FEEDINGS AND THE ROLE OF HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, supra note 133, at 21,40-46.
185. For a discussion of methodological issues and the divergence between the results
provided by qualitative and quantitative research, see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & James
Ron, Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact Through Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes, 61
WORLD POL. 360, 365 (2009).
186. Id. at 365-70.
187. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L.J. 1935, 1999 (2002); see also, e.g., Michael J. Gilligan & Nathaniel H. Nesbit, Do
Norms Reduce Torture?, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 445, 458 (2009) (examining the compliance of
countries that have signed, ratified, or acceded to the Torture Convention).
188. Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for
Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925, 940-50 (2005).
189. A copy of this poster is available online. WGBH Educ. Found., Interrogation
Rules of Engagement, FRONTLINE (Oct. 18, 2005), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
torture/paper/rules.html.
190. The official policy endorsing aggressive interrogation was, of course, one reason
why this poster was not effective. Building on work in behavioral psychology, I discuss
elsewhere how systemic and situational factors may be structured in order to enhance human
rights compliance. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 184.
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In Europe, the effects of human rights norms are more easily demon-
strable. Parties to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (which include all members of the Eu-
ropean Union) may be sued, and are often successfully sued, in the
European Court of Human Rights if they fail to comply with the provisions
of the convention. 9 ' It is possible to point to many cases where successful
proceedings before the court have led European nations to change policies
and practices. 192 The effect is more dramatic still in countries, such as the
United Kingdom, that have directly incorporated the European Convention
into domestic law, thereby giving individuals the right and opportunity to
bring proceedings for noncompliance in domestic courts. 193
Whether or not countries are subject to these kinds of enforcement
mechanisms, the account I offer here could play an important part in bridg-
ing the gap between states' human rights commitments and their human
rights compliance. However, it will be especially important in countries that
are not subject to such enforcement. By facilitating the state in the perfor-
mance of its obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights, they
will also enhance the prospect of broader acculturation of human rights
within their local and national communities.'94 It will always be difficult to
provide quantitative evidence to demonstrate the human rights efficacy of
professionals. In most cases, we will have to make do with case studies, oral
histories, and other qualitative evidence. But this kind of evidence can still
be very persuasive. After all, it took just a few professionals (principally
psychologists, physicians, and lawyers) to pave the way for the Bush admin-
istration's aggressive interrogation and detention regimes-the key players
could probably all have been seated around a large Thanksgiving dinner
191. See ECHR, supra note 25, art. 34 (providing that the European Court of Human
Rights "may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group
of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties
of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto"). In addition, parties to the
convention may bring cases against each other under Article 33 of the ECHR. Id. art. 33.
192. For a comprehensive analysis of European human rights law, see generally THE
LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 92.
193. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.). The Act, which incorporates the ECHR into
U.K. law, does not enable the courts to strike down legislation on the grounds that it is in-
compatible with the convention. However, national courts are empowered to issue a
"declaration of incompatibility," and the Human Rights Act provides an expedited procedure
to facilitate (but not compel) the passage of legislation intended to address the incompatibil-
ity. Id. §§ 4, 10.
194. Albert Dzur has argued for "democratic professionalism," which he describes as
an "inherently collaborative" enterprise that involves "sharing previously professionalized
tasks and encouraging lay participation in ways that enhance and enable broader public en-
gagement and deliberation about major social issues inside and outside professional
domains." ALBERT W. DZUR, DEMOCRATIC PROFESSIONALISM: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, IDENTITY, AND PRACTICE 130 (2008). If
Dzur's democratic professionals facilitate public engagement and deliberation about human
rights (a topic Dzur does not address in his book), they would also further the obligation
advanced in this Article and contribute to the acculturation of human rights.
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table. And, one might reasonably suggest, it would have taken fewer still to
prevent it.
The U.N. Global Compact recognizes the vital role that companies, in
particular powerful multinational corporations (MNCs), can play in ensur-
ing compliance with human rights-as well as the role they can (and
often) play in violating them.19 This Article makes a similar claim for the
professions. Professionals may not have the financial resources of MNCs,
which in some cases have turnovers that rival small nation states. But they
do have power by virtue of their social status, access, and expertise. And
this power can be considerable when professionals choose to exercise it
collectively.196 The obligation proposed in this Article is intended to com-
plement rather than supplant the human rights obligations of corporations
articulated in the U.N. Global Compact. Moreover, given corporations' in-
teractions with and dependence on a variety of professionals, the
professional ethical obligation advanced here should also enhance MNCs'
compliance with the Global Compact.
CONCLUSION
The drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights urged in the
preamble that "every individual and every organ of society" should keep the
195. See Overview, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
AboutTheGC/index.html (last updated Apr. 30, 2011); Bus. LEADERS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS ET AL., A GUIDE FOR INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
8-9 (2006), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues.doc/human-rights/
Resources/guide-hr.pdf. The compact contains ten principles. The first and second human
rights principles provide, respectively, that businesses should (1) "support and respect the
protection of internationally proclaimed human rights" and (2) "make sure that they are not
complicit in human rights abuses." The Ten Principles, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2012). In 2008, the U.N. Secretary-General's Special Representative on Business and Human
Rights, John Ruggie, also proposed a threefold framework outlining (1) "the state duty to
protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business;" (2) "the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights;" and (3) "greater access by victims to effective reme-
dy, both judicial and non-judicial." UN "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, Bus. &
HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR., http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/
Protect-Respect-Remedy-Framework (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). For further information
about the "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework and the drafting of guidance principles
for its implementation, see generally Home, Bus. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR, http://
www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortaUHome (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
196. The power and resources of the American Medical Association (AMA) deserve
special mention. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, between 1998 and 2011,
the AMA spent $264,767,500 on lobbying-more than any other entity in the United States,
with the sole exception of the U.S Chamber of Commerce-and has spent more than $20
million on lobbying every year between 2007 and 2011. Lobbying Spending Database, CTR.
FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=a&indexType=s
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012); American Medical Assn: Summary, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL.,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=DO00000068 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
The Author is grateful to Kirsten Austad and Michael Blanding for this information.
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document "constantly in mind."'1 97 But thinking about these rights is, of
course, not enough. The declaration also calls on every individual and organ
of society to "strive ... to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and
... to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance.' ' 98 As
I have argued, professionals and professional organizations are, respectively,
essential individuals and organs of society in local, national, and global en-
deavors to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. Although human rights
law and practice has not been at its most articulate when addressing the re-
sponsibilities of these individuals and their organizations, I have offered
an account here that seeks to provide a principled foundation. It is not, of
course, the only scholarly account to speak of the human rights obliga-
tions of professionals. But the novelty is in the endeavor to establish a
unified theory-broad enough in scope to apply across all professions, yet
sufficiently nuanced to allow for individuation among professions and
professionals. Taking human rights seriously means taking seriously the
role of professionals as human rights guardians. My objective here is to
animate that process.
197. UDHR, supra note 21, pmbl.
198. Id.
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